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SUMMARY 
The changes taking place in the maritime trade provide broad and complex areas of 
interrelationships that can be identified as the main reason leading to the need for a 
joint venture South African container industry. The world economics and commercial 
developments, intense competition, low freight rates, high operational cost, 
liquidations, loss of market share and trade necessitated the investigation of market 
strategies that will provide the South African container industry with a sustainable 
comparative advantages on the traditional North/South route. 
This study addresses the benefits of a joint venture between Safmarine and a South 
.. African Black Operator. The benefit of the joint venture is dual. Firstly, the operational 
benefits are realising economies of scale, more access to capital finance, stronger 
bargaining power and acquisition of a bigger market share. Secondly, there are 
benefits to the South African Balance of Payments because of retained foreign 
exchange spending on freight rates, the gaining of foreign exchange on freight 
earnings, the benefits associated with the flying of the South African flag, the skills 
transfer and maintenance of management skills in South Africa, and the opportunity 
to create black economic empowerment. With the expected growth and recovery of 
an export-led economy the latent benefits of a South African operator could have 
been realised if such a joint venture could have come about. However, Safmarine 
Container Line was sold to a foreign shipowner, i.e. AP Moller. Although, most of the 
operational benefits can be realised with such a buy-out, South Africa has lost the 
opportunity to become a significant player in the· shipping trade with ancillary 
benefits. 
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OPSOMMING 
Die veranderinge wat tans plaasvind in die maritieme handel veroorsaak wye en 
komplekse areas van onderlingsooreenkomste wat geidentifiseer kan word as die 
hoofrede vir die behoefte om 'n gesanientlike ooreenkoms in die Suid Afrikaanse 
houerskip industrie. Die wereld ekonomiese en kommersiele ontwikkelinge, hewige 
kompetisie, lae vragtariewe, hoe bed ryfskoste , likwidasies, verlies aan markaandeel 
en handel noodsaak die ondersoek na nuwe vergelykbare mark strategiee wat die 
Suid Afrikaanse houerskip industrie sal verseker van 'n langdurige kompeterende 
voordeel in die tradisionele Noord/Suid markte sal verseker . 
.. Hierdie studie spreek die voordele van 'n gesametlike ooreenkoms tusseo 
Safmarine, en 'n Suid Afrikaanse Swart Operateur aan, Die voordeel is tweeledig. 
Eerstens, die bedryfsvoordele deurdat skaalvoordele gerealiseer word, meer toegang 
tot kapitale finansiering verkry kan word, sterker mededingende mag en die 
verkryging van 'n groter markaandeel. Tweedens, is daar voordele vir die Suid 
Afrikaanse Betalingsbalans deurdie voorkoming van uitvloei van buitelandse val uta 
aan vraggeld en versekering, die inkomste uit vragverdienste, die verdien van 
buitelandse valuta aan vraggeld, die voordele wat gepaardgaan met die vaar van die 
Suid Afrikaanse vlag, die oordrag van vaardigheid en die behoud van 
bestuursvermoe in Suid Afrika, en die geleentheid am swart ekonomiese vol mag te 
skep. Met die verwagte ekonomiess groei en herstel van 'n uitvoer-gebasseerde 
ekonomie kon die latente voordeel van 'n Suid Afrikaanse operateur verwesentlik 
word indien so 'n gesamentlike ooreenkoms plaas gevind het Nieteenstaande, 
Safmarine Container Line was verkoop aan 'n buitelandse skeepseienaar, i.e. AP. 
Moller. Alhoewel, meeste van die bedryfsvoordele verwesentlik word as gevolg van 
die transaksie, het Suid Afrika-die __ geleentbeidverloor om 'n merkwaardige 
mededinger in die seehandel te word met die aanverwante voordele wat dit bied. 
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SECTION ONE 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The on-going changes in the world economy and maritime industry have created new 
ways of shipping trade and operations. Following the political changes of 1994, the 
South African economy was fully integrated into the world economy, and trade with 
South Africa opened new markets. South African commodity of exports captured a 
high demand in the overseas and regional markets: This was partly helped by the 
Rand, which lost value against major currencies and globalisation effects 
(decentralised production and trade liberalisation) which had seen huge capital 
investment movement all over the world. 
Globalisation resulted in intensive competition and low prices, more investment in 
equipment and commercial services and higher quality or improved services to the 
consumers. This resulted in smaller revenues. In late 1997, the Asian financial crisis 
affected many world economies and markets, and triggered a trend of currency 
depreciation in a number of countries. The Asian crisis also resulted in maritime and 
cargo trade imbalances,with most container cargoes bound for the west and empty 
containers to the east or Asia. 
The impact of these changes is considerably wider. In maritime trade there has been 
a response by shifting of services from traditional markets, which are severely 
affected, to less competitive and potential markets of the North/South. This has 
threatened the-stable _markets of Europe/African and indeed South African shipping 
services, which had for over half a century operated in these routes. 
Most of the carrier services moving into markets are top European and Asian 
companies, who receive many forms of support including subsidies from their 
governments, while their South African counterparts have never enjoyed commercial 
advantage provided by the government. The current government has also adopted a 
far too liberal view of free trade, which leaves the South African shipping industry 
1 
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· alone, faced with the threat of foreign carriers and the loss of competitive advantage. 
Therefore the call for an alternative approach, that carries with it economies of scale 
and major savings, is inevitable. 
The aim is not to drive away foreign carriers from the North/South routes. The 
objective is to maintain and enlarge market share, thereby allowing growth in 
revenues. 
1.1 Definition: Containership Joint Venture 
Joint ventures in the maritime field plays an increasingly important part, in bringing 
together various shipping organisations from different regions and differing sizes. As 
a result, the scope of maritime joint ventures is wide and therefore difficult to arrive at 
a precise definition. However the most important reason behind the launch of a 
shipping joint venture is because neither party has at its disposal all the elements 
necessary to realise the objective of the venture alone. 
Carden in 1984 attempted a definition of the shipping joint venture by stating that 
"each party relies on the bther to supply the missing elements .... to combine all or 
part of its functions with those of one or more other owners similarly placed, and 
thereby offer jOintly a rationalised service capable of fulfilling shippers' requirements 
in a way that no individual owner could do on his own."! 
Carden implied that the shipping industry could realise growth and advantages by 
way of pooling together their resources. The resources include capital investment, 
decision making, expertise and skills, company operations, etc. The main purpose of 
the majority of the maritime joint ventures is to enhance growth, strengthen market 
share, profitability and afford to offer quality service. This also means that companies 
in the joint venture share the synergies and strategic benefits of combining their 
operations and achieve major savings, which none of them could realise on their 
own. 
2 
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Grammenos and Xilas in 1996 provided another definition of maritime joint venture 
as follows: "a venture in the maritime sector that involves the association and 
existence of two or more partners in the formation of a separate new organisational 
and legal entity. It has its own force, momentum and operations, and can incur debt; 
sign shipping contracts or undertake other activities in its own registered name. 
However, it is jointly owned and controlled by the parent companies, without 
consequence to the financial or legal positions of its parents, except to the extent of 
their equity participation in the joint venture."2 
Grammenos and Xilas further separated their definition onto two key criteria, the first 
one being "... sepgrate new organisation and legal entity ... "3 They implied the 
creation of shipping pools with an aim of trading the vessels of members in a single 
fleet. These vessels are operated by one centralised marketing organisation at the 
same time the owners retaining the owners' obligations, for example operating costs 
of the jOint venture. The pool then pays out the income revenues of the vessels 
divided up among the participating owners in some pre-determined way. To this 
extent the pool acts as the owners' agent in respect of the vessels it operates. In 
addition this definition does not include liner and conference agreements within the 
sphere of maritime joint ventures. 
The second criterion is " ... without consequence to the financial or legal positions of 
its parents ... ,,4 This means that the parent companies which are providing financial 
support, technical expertise, managerial skills local market knowledge, etc should not 
be legally or financially responsible, except to the amount of the equity contribution, 
to the joint venture. 
Cooke in 1986 gave an interim definition of the shipping joint venture as follows: " an . 
enterprise, corporation, or partnership formed by two or more companies, individuals 
or organisations, at least one of which is an operating entity wishing to broaden its 
activities for the purposes of conducting new profit- motivated business of a more or 
less permanent duration."s. Cooke and Carden's definitions have common ground, 
which include companies that compliment each other in terms of their individual 
missing elements. 
3 
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In 1984 D'Orsay defined the maritime joint ventures as "an association of generally 
two, sometimes three or several, partners, in order to achieve a common purpose or 
target. .. when one partner is incorporating another into his organisation, it is a merger 
or acquisition, but not a joint venture ... Association, co-operation, marriage, are 
criteria of the joint venture.,,6 D'Orsay's definition of jOint ventures makes some clear 
distinctions between mergers/acquisitions and joint ventures. In the case of a merger 
or acquisition a partner is incorporated into another organisation while a joint venture 
entails integration of two or more companies on equal basis. 
1.2 Types of Shipping Joint Ventures 
Although the scope of the maritime jOint ventures from the above appear wide the 
orientation of the jOint venture should be viewed in respect of the purpose and 
intensity of the co-operation relative to' the objectives of the joint venture. However, 
the Euro-centric view entails a wide spectrum of economic growth and development, 
makes distinctions of maritime joint ventures in terms of the state of the economic 
development. The observation takes a general. view of joint ventures between 
shipowners in developed and less developed or developing economies. 
1.2.1 Joint Venture between Shipowners 
Most maritime jOint ventures, which are between shipowners, are found in developed 
economies, and most of them are private companies. Joint ventures in less 
developed or developing countries are mostly-·government or·state-controlled 
organisations and not private entities. The reason being the lack of capital, 
managerial skills and experience, as well as government control over cargoes or 
tonnage supplied. 
The difference between the two forms of joint ventures lies in the objectives of the 
organisations. For instance joint ventures in developed economies are more 
concerned about stabilisation of income through risk spreading, increasing income 
4 
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through economies of scale, the reduction or control of costs. While the joint ventures 
in less developed economies are driven by the ability to participate in previously 
unattainable business, because of size constraints, lack of capital, insufficient 
experience, thereby resulting in increased market coverage. 7 
Regardless of these differences the world economic slump depressed the freight 
market that increased the need to stabilise income and control costs in all 
organisations. For instance both in developed and developing economies the 
containership sector, which previously exhibited a degree of stability has essentially 
been driven to cost reduction and consolidation by the Asian crisis, increased 
competition, newbuilding deliveries, etc. In South Africa the need for a container 
shipping joint venture is mainly driven by competition, cost controls and market 
survival. This is so because there has been a substantial shift of carriers moving into 
less competitive markets of the North/South route. 
1.2.2 Joint Venture between Shipowners and Charterers 
Another interesting form of jOint venture is one between shipowner and charterer. 
The main objective of the charterer is to arrange the transport of cargo, while the 
shipowner wants to provide the transport to fulfil this requirement. In this regard the 
vessel ownership for the charterer or chartering activity for the shipowner do not 
constitute the main areas of business. 
Apparently, a conflict of interest arises due to the fact that the shipowner and the 
charterer have opposing freight rates.-Eorexample when the market is high, the 
charterer pays high rates on the spot market. Because ship values and profits are 
high, there are more incentives for the charterer to move towards a jOint venture. To 
the contrary, there are little or no incentives for the shipowner to call for a joint 
venture. On the other hand when the market falls the situation is reversed. The 
charterer pays low rates because the ship values and profits are low. There is no 
incentive for the charterer to push for a joint venture while the incentives for the 
shipowner to participate in a joint venture are greater. 
5 
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Charterers may also take a speculative view of the market; for example the charterer 
may decide to participate in a jOint venture, taking an equity interest when the market 
is low in order to profit when the market turns, aiming to save on capital costs. 
However, a joint venture may also be achieved by the charterer through offering of 
cargo and labour, while the shipowner provides capital and management. This type 
of joint ventures are more common from the Euro-centric view point- between 
shipowners of developed economies and charterers of developing economies. The 
shipowners want constant availability of cargo (stability), improved revenue, and 
increased vessel utilisation with decreased costs (i.e. ballasting and chartering). The 
charterers on the other hand want stability of transport costs and security (availability 
of transport) accompanies by profit generation in the case of equity participation. 
In South Africa the Euro-centric view does not matter much because about 65% of 
the commercial deep-sea shipping is in private hands. Safmarine the largest South 
African shipping company has been in the business for over fifty years and its 
success was due to the North/South markets, which are under threat from shipping 
companies from developed economies. The study explores a South African container 
shipping joint venture that is deemed to bring economies of scale and allowing the 
new entity run as a single company on the basis of the synergies of the participating 
companies. 
This position goes beyond ship sharing in order to reduce both sea and land costs. 
The push for this co-operation arisE3s. ~r~m .t~_~ ~e.~H~~~io~._~y the carriers that rates 
are diminishing, and hence cost has become their public enemy number one. In 
South Africa and elsewhere the need for a carrier with the possible lowest unit cost 
with the ability for market dominance could be comprehended in a consolidated 
containership joint venture and this is the thrust of the dissertation. However, this 
proposition is also founded on the equation for ship-related costs in operating, that 
constitute somewhere between 30% to 45% of the carriers' expenditure. The balance 
relates to non-marine activities. Against this background a jOint venture arrangement 
could be embraced to access savings in the remaining 55% to 70% of the total costs. 
6 
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1.2 3 The Containership Joint Venture Challenges in South Africa 
Following the socio-economic changes of 1994 there has a relative growth of 
international trade in merchandise products between the rest of the world and South 
African. As a result there have been strategic changes in the container industry 
between South Africa and the world. Growth in merchandise has attracted major 
container players into the North-South routes from their traditional markets of the 
West-East, which are proving competitive and less profitable. Therefore an 
"umbrella" organisation such as a joint venture could be adopted to help consolidate 
business in order to hold strong positions in the North-South markets. For that reason 
the study proposes a theoretical Safmarine/South African Black operators joint 
venture to make such a challenge and to create a competitive strength in South 
African container shipping. The joint investment would be geared towards cost 
savings, market dominance and profitability. It would also change or influence the 
South African trade balances and contribute towards a positive growth of the 
economy. 
The joint venture is of strategic value, as the two companies would acquire value by 
cash infusion. This will create new opportunities for shipping finance from the local 
and international sectors. By merging capital and operations the JV would reduce 
costs by having all their financial concerns under one roof, gain better buying power, 
improve their credit rating and have the ability to renew and expand their fleets. This 
could help the company break into new waters and benefit from the high influx of 
sophisticated financial availability in the markets. 
The joint venture would register their vessels with the South African ship registry. 
Since the end of the trade and cargo embargo the South African registry still holds 
about six commercial ships flying the national flag even though Safmarine, Unicorn 
and some ship operating companies have their ships under the foreign registries for 
tax and commercial advantages. The venture would certainly elevate the level of the 
registry, create additional fiscal contribution and national prestige. 
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1.3 Development and Dynamics of the Containership Industry 
1.3.1. Conference System 
Market dynamics and the desire to cut down costs on the other hand threaten the 
hegemony of the conference system's future. The demands of the complicated 
logistic systems of the present container shipping with its diverse variations in service 
and quality are calling for the need for flexible new forms of co-operation. Many 
operators would want the cumbersome procedures that have frequently prevented 
the conferences from reacting quickly to sudden shifts in market growth to be 
abandoned. For many newcomers the open conferences are just simply not worth 
joining, while closed conferences have been unwilling to offer new entrants sufficient 
elbow room to be able to offer economically viable service. 
In the words of Hans-Jakobs Kruse, the Chairman of Hapag-Lloyd AG, "co-operation 
systems such as conferences will survive and prosper if they: 
• keep their tariffs, services and conditions market oriented; 
• streamline cumbersome decision making procedures; 
• allow their members as much freedom as possible; and 
• improve public relations." 
However the future of the container lines is assured because the industry is the 
backbone of international commerce. It is also assured if their unit costs are 
minimised; if the industry is better prepared for the continuous investment needed in 
hard and software and with long-term commitment to the trade as operators will not 
be prone to a "fast buck" attitude which is more prevalent in individuals. 
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1.3.1.1 Consortia 
During the last twenty years the container line industry has moved through several 
organisational phases in the search for lower costs, improved pricing system 
reinforced market presence, improved competitiveness and profitability. At the outset 
of containerisation, it was the consortia concept, which held sway, either with or 
without joint marketing. There was a swing towards independent operations in the 
1980s as lines looked to assume sole control of operations. At the end of the 1980s it 
became apparent that this approach was impossible- even the largest lines could not 
assume sole responsibility for either funding growth needed to keep pace with cargo 
flows or for filling the increasingly larger vessels which were being deployed. This led 
to the idea of "partnerisation" - an approach of stabilisation agreements and bi or tri-
partite vessel sharing agreements. None of these developments delivered acceptable 
levels of carrier profitability. 
These developments were all introduced int() conference and non-conference liners. 
Their biggest achievement was improved co-operation among operators. Many of 
these included voluntary capacity that served to permit the industry to survive large-
scale capacity additions and low freight rates over a long period of time. 
1.3.2 Industrial Consolidation 
-
Consolidation means the movement of the container industry from fragmentation to 
an environment that created large players. This includes container phases of 
alliances, mergers and joint ventures. It has led players to be able to differentiate 
both their product quality and production technology. As a result consolidation has 
improved the voyage economics in terms of voyage quality and production 
technology and also achieved better levels of profit and return on capital. 
9 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
1.3.2.1 Alliances 
The concept of global or grand alliances emerged during the first half of the 1990s. It 
was also borne out of financial necessity rather than preference. The alliances 
spurred on by the need for established operators to replace ageing fleets and 
establish a new type of operation with the optimum economy of scale effect. It 
brought some of the members into new trades and of much greater importance, 
moved beyond the confines of single route alliance and simple ship sharing and 
extended to land side operations as well. As a result the rapid growth in new capacity 
_created opportunities for new· combination possibilities in cargo mix. i.e. Bulk and 
Container operators and led to new competitors. The new entrants had less regard 
for traditional patterns of the industry and in particular, to the existing differentiated 
tariff systems in these markets. This triggered a fundamental change in the liner 
trades from a specialised niche operator business into an undifferentiated commodity 
business. The commodity was the container slot, and the issue was price. 
Table 1.1: The World Global Alliances 
World Total Fleet 
Ranks* Vessels Slots 
APl 11 38 81,547 
MOL 7 66 118,208 
Nedlloyd 6 60 118,599 
OOCl 19 23 55,811 
Global Alliance Total 187 375,165 
Hapag-Lloyd 15 28 71,688 
NOl 16 35 63,469 
NYK 5 73 137,018 
P&OCl 8 46 98,893 
Grand Alliance Total _.1.82 '311.068 
Maersk 2 97 186,040 
Sea-land 1 109 196,708 
Alliance Total 206 382,748 
Cho Yang 20 21 33,014 
DSR-Senator 14 39 75,497 
Hanjin 9 35 . 92,332 
Alliance Total 95 200,843 
. 
*Basis of total vessel slots operated 1 September 1995 
Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd. 
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The minimal differentiation between the competitors, which emerged, led to intense 
competition and the emphasis was focussed on low cost operations and the efficient 
management of the land activities. In addition to the logistical advantages achieved 
through co-ordination of activities into one single operation the formation of alliances 
generated substantial cost advantages, namely; 
• increased bargaining power, through combining the purchasing 
requirements of the parties (berthing right, supplies, etc.); 
• by swapping TEU slots and boxes both the ships and the boxes become 
logistically more flexible, reducing the number of ballast legs and increasing 
capacity utilisation levels; 
• by combining services the client is offered greater frequency, reducing land 
storage and other capital costs (Le. improved productivity); 
• by consolidating freight into more economical "parcels", ships are able to 
call at fewer ports and save on both port charges and lost productive sailing 
time; and 
• being able to react rapidly to changes in the demand, swapping a large 
ship for a smaller ship (or vice versus) to maximise fleet utilisation on a 
particular trade route. 
The explosion of capacity on the entire world's .m~j~~ r~~!~s forced the liner industry 
once again moving into an era where the emphasis is be on product differentiation. 
However carriers are satisfied with the service improvements which alliances have 
produced but it is not certainly the most novel element in the motivation to form such 
partnership. 
While alliances offer the prospects of co-operation between members, companies 
have their own marketing and administrative strategies, and are slow to deliver the 
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scale benefits that is basically required. Lack of complete integration still provides for 
differential costs and hence could not enhance the basic strategy of the alliances. On 
the other hand the scale of alliance agreements, and the expense involved in 
dismantling old partnership and inaugurating new ones, has been so great that the 
alliances are all long-term ventures. The Grand Alliance, for instance, is a ten years 
pact, while the Global Alliance is fixed to 2005 in the transpacific markets and to 
2001 in the Asia-ECNA and Asia-Europe trades. 
Today multinational and national container groups have re-emerged as new forms of 
co-operation offering consolidated jOint investments, with considerable cost savings 
as opposed to global or grand alliances. It has been realised that the logistical 
potential is unlikely to materialise until resources are pooled under a· single 
management operation in which jOint venture arrangements are favoured over 
alliances. 
1.3.2.2 Joint Ventures, Mergers and Take-overs . 
Joint venture is not a new word in international business although it has been 
regarded by the students of strategic management as a new concept bound to 
reduce costs and employ equity in the most effective way in order to reap reasonable 
return on capital investment. Mergers and take-overs alike are also business 
strategies more or less on the same lines with joint ventures depending on the level 
and degree of integration of the merging companies. 
However, if joint investment negotiationstAat form co-ordinated operations and a 
sharing of the capital obligations, fail to produce a profitable carrier industry, it would 
be unavoidable that some carriers sacrifice their market by hostile take-overs. As a 
result joint ventures and mergers are shaping the liner industry into a more 
consolidated industry. 
The joint venture concept has been instrumental in the current large-scale increases 
in unit size of container carriers from 5,200 TEUs to over 6,000 TEUs, and the 
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planned introduction of the post post panamax size of 15,000 TEUs. These units will 
however pose new challenges in the 21 st century. However the orderbook in 1996 
showed an excess of 30% and in 1997 container capacity shot up by 18% while the 
world-wide container trade was rurining at a snail pace. These will result in short-term 
lower slot capacity utilisation, lower freight rates and lower vessel/asset values. 
However there are also demands for further investment and improvements in the 
economics of carriers that includes container inventory, acquisitions and 
management. 
Finally the joint venture process will reduce global competitors. The process will 
result in a fierce competition that will drive down freight prices. Profits and positive 
cash flows, which are currently in the red in many shipping companies, could be 
mainly a result of cost savings and efficient services. This is however the other major 
contention of this study. Above all the study favours a national joint venture rather 
than a transnational JV (i.e. a joint venture comprised of two or more companies of 
different nationalities). 
1.4 Purpose of the Study 
The study uses a hypothetical approach that proposes a jOint venture between 
Safmarine Container Lines and a South African black ship operator merging their 
container shipping businesses on a SO/50 basis. The purpose of the study is to 
expand and vie for market consolidation by South African shipowners through joint 
venture investment rather than independent or fragmented container ownership. The 
South African container carrier needs to grow and defend their market share in the 
North-South routes of Europe-AfriCa -(West, East and South Africa) and North 
America-South Africa. These are crucial markets in the sense that the world's most 
industrialised markets such as the East-West route preoccupy most major container 
players. Because the North-South markets are developing and proving profitable, 
while the West-East markets are becoming unprofitable and very competitive, it is 
logical that big container player will soon join the North-South markets. 
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To justify expansion of the carrier fleet the study also provides a review of the World 
and South African (African) economy, trade analysis and theoretical cost savings 
offered by jOint investment. These would reflect a clearer assessment of the risks 
associated with the financial lending decisions and appropriately pricing of the loans. 
The study also discusses the constraints of JVs and also provides possible prospects 
of container shipping in South Africa. 
1.5 Methodology 
The empirical foundation of this study is based on interpretative research 
methodology by utilising the previ()us studies, structured interviews, brain storming 
and analysis of published shipping investment materials. This would help draw a 
scenario based on trends in order to point out areas of success and failure of a joint 
venture of this nature. 
1. Carden, P.M.A "Maritime Joint Venture- Liner and Through Transport Operations, Co~ference Paper 1984 
2. Grammenos, C Th and Xilas, E.M. "Shipping Investment and Finance", 1996 page 17-2 
3.lbid, page 17-2 
4. Ibid, page 17-3 
5. Cooke, G.C.M. "Finaing Maritime Joint Venture", presentation at International Piraeus Meeting, 1986 
6. D'Orsay, P. P. "The Risk Element in Joint Venture" Conference Presentation- International Chamber of 
Commerce and Lloyd's of London Press Ltd, 1984. 
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SECTION TWO 
2.1 The Strategic Value of the Joint Venture 
The theoretical Safmarine/South African Black operators joint venture is both timely 
and of great value. The capital infusion of the two companies would create less 
financial burden as compared to a single or an independent company. The Basle 
Committee of July 1988, which was preceded by the introduction of the capital 
adequacy rules in 1993, resulted in stricter capital input measures. The rules 
severely limited lending risk; introduced greater client selectivity and appraisal; more 
strict loan terms and conditions (e.g. higher spreads); shorter maturities and greater 
security requirements; a decreased in guarantees; and more emphasis on fee 
generation as opposed to interest generated income. 
As a result the owners' capital inputs for vessel acquisition went up to a range 
between 20% and 50% depending on particular cases and circumstances. Previously 
the owners' capital inputs had dropped from a minimum of 50% in 1940s/50s to 20% 
and even dropped to 0% during the liberal credit periods of 1967173 and 1980/82. 
(C.Th. Grammenos and E. M. Xilas, Shipping Investment and Finance, page10-16). 
To overcome these capital requirements the call for joint investment could be 
reinforced in the South African container industry in order to scoop the benefits of 
shared capital and jOint operational costs. . 
Apart from the capital infusion in the partnership the South African joint venture 
would enjoy the operational stability already achieved by Safamarine in the 
commercial shipping operation. Through good management Safmarine survived the 
international trade and cargo embargo prior to 1994 and Safmarine expanded and 
intensified their operations. They are predominantly running three major markets 
namely, bulk; reefer; and container shipping. In addition Safmarine had diversified 
into many other similar sectors of air transport services, freight and terminal logistics; 
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and also invested into hotels and casinos before the recent unbundling of some of 
these units. 
Safmarine's success is that of a growing company and business confidence in the 
region and the North-South markets. It also gained higher professional expertise, 
networking and logistical facilities of international standards. This could however lift 
the jOint venture's creditworthiness to higher levels in order to meet their investment 
financial requirements. 
Inviting the Black operators in the container joint venture investment is a challenging 
proposition.The~strategy is to ensure that South Africans rather thartfor~ign carriers 
enjoy the benefits of the joint venture consolidation. Assuming that the South African 
Black operators are a theoretical medium size company, which has successfully 
operated chartered and leased vessels in numerous sectors of deep-sea shipping. 
The operators have created wealth and decided to specialise in the container sector. 
They intend to exploit the jOint venture with Safmarine Container Lines as an 
"umbrella" organisation to strengthen their positions in the North-South markets. 
The containership joint venture with Safmarine is a consoli dative strategy to create a 
cost competitive advantage in the Europe/South Africa route. The Black operators 
alone cannot effectively compete without the support of an African giant. 
The strategic advantages of the joint venture are as follows: 
• the provision of easy capital inputs through joint investment; 
• the provision of a dominant market share; 
• the JV will act as a hedge against foreign container powers; 
., reduction of the current high shipping costs through shared costs; 
• the creation and saving of foreign currency earnings, and 
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• no dividends or profit share will be expatriated to overseas owners. 
Beside this the joint venture will be a strategic tool to pursue support in container 
expansion under the economic empowerment programme of the government. 
2.2 South African Merchant Shipping Policy 
The current shipping policy of non-intervention may suggest that the government has 
not acknowledged the important role played by shipping in the economic 
development of the country. This policy was carried forward from the previous 
government and has not catered for the changes taking place in maritime trade, 
resulting in the bulk of the cargo business is still in the hands of foreigner carriers. 
More than 50% of the containerised trade, over 75% of the exports and over 80% of 
the imports of the bulk commodities that include petroleum are still in the hands of 
foreign carriers. (Report of the Committee of Inquiry into National Maritime Policy for 
the Republic of South Africa, page 72, 1993). 
The study is not calling for the government to adopt a protectionist policy or 
subsidising the South African shipping industry. The government could have 
legislative support that makes it possible to intervene when ever necessary. Since 
" 
the era of the previous government South African shipowners operated under 
economic sanctions -and trade embargo without governmental assistance or support 
in the past while their competitors still continue to receive support from their 
governments up to today. 
The government needs to be aware of the benefits of developing and advancing the 
South African shipping industry in order; 
• to reduce dependence on foreign carriers, 
• to increase the country's net foreign currency earnings, 
• to promote the country's foreign trade, and 
• to strengthen the political position of South Africa. 
17 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
These can be achieved when the government creates and influences a business 
environment that gives a lease of life to the South African shipping industry. The 
government could introduce incentives necessary to attract exporters and importers 
to choose South African vessels by way of offering reduced duties. This can also be 
used to cargoes moved on elF to overseas and FOB into the country. These 
incentives could amount to a subsidy to the South African shipowners, but can do 
little to breach international agreements or conventions. Similar incentives are more 
common in market oriented countries in Europe and America. 
In terms of financing acquisitions of vessels, government policy matters quite 
substantially. Financiers would want to see a clear government policy in order to 
warrant their capital financing. Subsidies may not always be attractive in ship 
financing, but a country's shipping policy should be elaborative and a signal showing 
support in a business environment. 
The policy of economic redistribution and empowerment could be used to enhance 
the development of the shipping industry in South Africa. In South Africa shipping is 
one industry with a strong economic _ potential that has not been exploited at full 
scale. If this policy is realised in shipping then the container joint venture proposal 
would merit government support and backing for effective participation of the Black 
operators. Government backing can help the joint venture to access sophisticated 
international finance. 
In short the tool of economic redistribution and empowerment should not lie idle. It 
could be a strong weapon used to source international finance. In the joint venture it 
. - could be used to equip the Black operators with experience and techniques and 
promote the advancement of the whole industry. Companies in the jOint venture of 
similar arrangements would also benefit from the moral and economic support 
granted by the government in terms of investment guarantees. 
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2.3 Economic Incentive for the Joint Venture 
The most important objective for the joint venture is the reduction of cost or cost 
savings, shared capital investment, spread of financial risk, improvement in capital 
asset utilisation, the benefits of network integration and market knowledge. The 
incentive for this joint venture may go further as the integration of Safmarine and the 
Black operators may achieve the economies of scale. The recent mergers between 
containership owners such as P & 0 and Nedlloyd, and Neptune Orient and 
American President Lines mark a common move but could in the long run be marred 
by different nationalities and the lack of common objectives. 
However, the Safmarine/Black operators joint venture could afford to provide much 
more frequent, more extensive and more reliable services, which would result in an 
increase market share. Typical JVs have been able to increase their traffic volume 
across the board, particularly the traffic of time sensitive, high value cargo and low 
tariff cargo. As a result margin could grow substantially and costs contained as 
revenue increases. Beside greater utilisation of vessels and equipment JVs have 
greater impact by use of shared integrated information management and EDI 
systems particularly in equipment, cargo flow, and ship loading management 
systems. 
In short the economic incentive of the Safmarine/Black operators joint ventur~ falls 
into the following categories: 
• improvements in service frequency-and quality and therefore door-to-door 
service time and cost; 
• improvements in vessel and equipment utilisation and thereby reductions in 
fixed and variable costs; 
• improvements in market share and high value cargo bookings; 
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• reduction in intermodal storage (inland depot) and port terminal throughput 
costs; 
• reduction in financial and other fixed costs such as insurance; 
• co-ordination and integration of MIS and EDI systems and services for 
greater efficiency and market penetration; 
• improvements in logistic chain management and economies of scale by 
equipment, depot, terminal and vessel utilisation, and 
• pooling of knowledge and sharing of research efforts. 
Overall the container JV will help operators to not only become more profitable, but to 
overcome entry barriers to domestic and international markets, to increase market 
share internationally and to acquire market power in the North-South markets. 
2.4 The Impact of·Joint Ventures on Container Shipping 
In view of limited and insufficient financial resources- shipping lines resort to more 
forms of co-operation which would reinforce the economic vitality of the companies. 
Since shipping requires huge capital investments and costs incurred on a daily basis, 
it has been proved that non of the companies is in a position to hold out alone. 
Therefore jOint ventures have exerted decisive pressure on world-wide container 
shipp~ing to find a partner with whom to pool resources together. As a result there has 
been effective shutting out of independents and closing of ranks by grouping of 
operators. Independent operators, Consortia and Alliances have been forced into 
financial distress and some of them eventually collapsed, some bought out or taken 
over. 
These changes taking place in the maritime sector have been characterised by the 
inevitable necessity to come together and the demand for approaches such as joint 
ventures reinforces co-operation. Therefore the theoretical joint venture proposal 
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between Safmarine/Black operators is not coincidence. It is borne out of the need to 
create a competitive front that would stand any form of domination by foreign 
container owners, and to maximise revenue earnings. The joint venture is also a 
direct response to world economic developments. There is pessimism about the 
scale and extent of the Asian financial crisis. Following the crisis many markets are 
sliding into economic slump and hence bear less activity and experience a reduction 
in volumes. 
Economic developments elsewhere have pushed many major carriers out of their 
traditional markets to less competitive markets of the North-South. As a result they 
have threatened established operators of the North-South markets namely 
Safmarine, hence the need for joint venture consolidation and a change for survival. 
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SECTION THREE 
3. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS 
The state of the world economy and political events exercise a major influence on 
shipping markets and form an important part of the conditions for shipping investment 
analysis. They can also have a direct influence over the supply and demand and 
price trends. Economic and political developments carry with them structural 
changes, regulatory and legal development, affect competition, cyclical and seasonal 
trends, product differentiation and marketing. These factors have been quite evident 
in shaping the dynamics of the shipping markets including the container industry. 
3.1 World Economic Prospects 
According to the IMF survey on world economic outlook of 1998 the global GDP was 
slowed by the Asian financial crisis, which dropped from 3.1 % in 1997 to 2.7% in 
1998. The IMF affirms that North America was partly offset by improvements in the 
transition economies of, Western Europe and sub-Sahara Africa. The same survey 
shows Asia as the slowest-growing region in 1997/98 while the transition economies 
were the fastest growing economies. Similarly, the EIU forecast shown in Table 3.1 
indicates that nineteen economies would have grown by 6% or more by end of 1998, 
these include the transition economies, Asia, sub-Sahara Africa and the Middle East. 
The same forecast also suggests--that developing-economies in 1997/98 would be 
slower partly caused by the Asian financial crisis and weaker economic performance, 
especially in Latin America and Middle East. 
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Table 3.1: World Economic Growth 
Regions 1996 1997 1998 
I 
Asia & Australia 3.8 2.8 2.4 
Latin America & tlie Cari6bean 3.7 5.1 3.2 
Mjddle East & North Africa ,. 4 .5 2.7 2.8 
.' •• ,~, "j""" 
North America 2.7 3.7 2.5 
Sub-5ahara Africa ~ 3.9 3.2 3.6 
Transition Economies 0.1 2.3 4.1 
lNestemEUf ope 1.8 2.6 3.0 
Total GroWth World 3.1 3.1 2.7 
, ...... !' 
-:' -r/' 1.,;. .• 
Source: EIU Ltd. 
However the slower global economic growth of 1998 was also accompanied by lower 
inflation. This is evident in the world consumer price inflation going down from 5.1% 
in 1997 to 4.3% in 1998 as indicated in Table3.2. Generally inflation in the developed 
world was less than 3% by end of 1998, while deflationary pressures were quite 
evident in Japan. In the developing world the inflation rate will be expected to decline 
in all regions as sound macroeconomic policies build on the progress seen over the 
last few years. The global disinflationary pressures are reinforced by the prospects of 
commodity prices. 
The fall of Asia in the growth league table has been sudden and sharp. After heading 
the table in 1996, the financial crisis spread from the ASEAN economies to South 
Korea by end of 1997, exposing the weaknesses in many Asian countries' financial 
markets. The corrective measures that will be necessary will inevitably lead to a 
sharp slowdown in growth and an increase in inflation, but there will be an 
improvement in the current account deficits. 
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Table 3.2: World Inflation 
Source: IMF Ltd. 
The major risk to the global economy arising from the Asian financial crisis is of 
contagion, with the possibility that Asia's woes have already infected other regions in 
the world. This is going to lead to a meltdown of the global stock markets. The sharp 
fall of asset prices in Asia in 1997 presents a global deflationary impact, especially in 
the developed world and particularly the United States. For example Asia account for 
nearly 30% of the US exports and 40% of the US imports. There is already a 
significant deterioration in the United States trade deficit with Asia as the United 
States exports market in Asia drying up. At the same time Asian exports to the United 
States will be competitively priced. Western Europe is less affected as only 10% of its 
total trade are with Asia, although Asia investment in Europe will suffer. 
Figure 3.1: Global Foreign Direct Investment Flows, 1994 
Source: UN World Investment Report, 1995 
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3.2 The OECD Economies 
Despite the Asian financial crisis, economic expansion in industrialised countries has 
been significant. The impact of the crisis on growth prospects for the principal DECO 
economies except Japan, is still modest. Constant expansion will continue beyond 
the turn of the century. According to the IMF assessment, the global output growth 
went up from 3,5% in1995 to 3,8% in 1996, and further improved by 4% in 1998. As 
a result the currently DECO aggregated economic performance is by far superior 
than experienced during the slump of the early 1990s. This is due to a solid 
prospective growth of domestic demand in these countries and limited spillover 
effects of the Asian crisis. 
Table 3.3: Economic Development, G7 Countries (% GOP growth at Market price) 
3.3 North America 
The Asian crisis coincided with a strong performance in North America, with the 
United States operating at near capacity. Expansion particularly in the United States 
is in advanced stages. In 1997 economic growth led to tightening in the labour 
markets conditions with unemployment falling to 4.5% by 1998. Growth has also 
stimulated a gradual pick-up in wages. The falling import prices associated with the 
strengthening dollar have helped to contain inflationary pressures that emerged in 
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the face of sustained above-potential growth. Deflationary impact of the Asian crisis 
on the American economy had in late 1997 put U.S interest rates on hold. High 
investment in new capacity has helped to contain cost pressures with advances in 
productivity growth outpacing the rise in wages. 
The strength of the U.S. economy has however buoyed government revenues. The 
general government deficit was almost eliminated in 1997 and recorded a budget 
surplus of over US$17 billion in 1998, the first ever in a period of 29 years. The 
growth rate of real GOP in 1998 is about 3%, reflecting the weakening of external 
demand associated with the Asian crisis and the strengthening of the dollar. 
3.4 Western Europe 
The economic slow down in Europe of the first half of the1990s weakened domestic 
demand. But when output recovered in1996 industrial confidence gradually 
strengthened. This has made possible the economic and monetary union (EMU) 
making progress towards convergence. Of the 15 EU member states, only 4 are not 
planning to participate at the· onset. Denmark, Sweden, and· the United Kingdom 
have indicated that they do not wish to participate at this point, and Greece is aiming 
to join by 2001 . 
The eligibility for joining the EMU was based on economic performance in relation to 
convergence criteria in the area of inflation, public finance, interest rates, and 
exchange rates, specified in the Maastricht Treaty. As result there has been 
considerable progress in reducing inflation and fiscal imbalances since the signing of 
the treaty in 1990. With the exception of Greece-, which nonetheless has made 
important progress- inflation and long-term interest rates in the EU, countries were 
below the Maastricht reference value in 1997. The general government deficit 
satisfied the 3% of GOP reference value as indicated in Table 3.2 
There has been no major tension within the exchange rate mechanism (ERM) since 
1995. There seems little question about the sustainability of inflation performance, 
with prices projected to rise by 2% a year in 1998/1999 in the EU as a whole. Priority 
has been given to price stability in-the statute of the European-Central Banks (ECB). 
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Regarding the government debt particular attention has focused on how EU council 
will interpret the Maastricht criteria for countries with debt ratios that, while falling, are 
of the order of 100% or higher. Long-term interest rates will differ by a V4 of 1 % point 
or less among the countries participating in the EMU in 1999. 
Table 3.4: European Union: Convergence Indicators (%) 
Sweden 
Austria 
Denmark 
Finland 
Greece 
Portugal 
Ireland 
Source: IMF staff projections 
Of the countries participating in the EMU in 1999, Finland, Ireland, and Luxembourg 
had underlying fiscal positions of balance or surplus in 1998. For the other eight, 
structural fiscal deficits are the range of about 1-2.5% of GOP. These countries are 
expected to strengthen their fiscal positions if they are to comply with the medium 
term requirements of the agreed Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Of the four 
countries that do not plan to join the Euro area at this stage, Denmark and Sweden 
have already achieved a structural budgetary surplus, and the UK was getting closer 
to structural balance by end of 1998. 
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However, economic performance in most EU countries has been hampered by 
excessive rigidities in product and labour markets. Lack of increased flexibility in 
labour markets, which is critical for a stable and successful Euro-area economy. The 
broad consensus in favour of policies was directed at price stability and insufficient 
progress was made in reducing structural unemployment. Without such support 
consolidation will be difficult. A decline in unemployment can facilitate fiscal 
consolidation, while the durability of fiscal consolidation in the face of persistent high 
unemployment will inevitably be open to criticism. 
A satisfactory fiscal position is a prerequisite for tax cuts needed in most EU member 
countries to strengthen incentives to work and investment. Thus, fiscal consolidation 
will also need to focus on spending, while measures to tackle unemployment should 
be broadly based, emphasising deregulation and reform of social benefits as well as 
tax reduction. 
On the other hand the United Kingdom economy continued to grow at above-
potential rate for 1997. Unemployment declined to 5%. Inflation has been around 
2.5%. Domestic demand has continued to provide the main impetus to growth, with 
net exports rising in the face of the sterling's real appreciation since 1996. However 
exports began to slow down in 1998 due to loss of competitiveness and the Asian 
crisis. Domestic demand moderated partly reflecting the tightening of monetary 
conditions during 1997 and continuing fiscal consolidation. 
Generally, demand has strengthened in much of Western Europe and North America. 
This is mainly due to reduced real interest rates owing to the redirection of financial 
investments toward mature markets. Domestic demand will see much of its support 
from the terms of trade gains brought by the fall of commodity prices as a result of 
depreciation of currencies in Asia and much of the developing economies. In total the. 
Asian crisis has exerted disinflationary effect-·-oAindustrialised economies, thus 
reducing the risk of overheating in countries operating at high levels of resource 
utilisation, in particular the United States. As a result there has been be a strong 
consumer confidence in the advanced economies. In the United States consumer 
confidence has neared the highs reached in the 1960s. 
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3.5 Japan and the Far East 
The roots of the Asian economic growth dates back to the 1960s with Japan being 
the economic dynasty of the region. The main driving force creating this growth was 
the economic performance of the countries in the region, which in turn stimulated 
consumption and expansion of production. Despite the 1990/91 world economic 
slump, countries in the Far East continued to enjoy high economic growth, as can be 
seen in Table 3.5 and Figure 3.2. Output growth was ahead of the principal OECD 
economies. 
However, increased expansion of production capacities outpaced regional demand 
and this caused the built-up to the 1997 Asian economic crisis. As a result 
companies are grappling with inventories built up after domestic sales dropped. 
Industrial output fell down to lowest levels. Demand for merchandise and luxuries 
have diminished. Exports dropped down by 20% due to downsized production and 
loss of competitiveness following lower freight rates, which were primarily caused by 
devaluation of several regional currencies in 1997. The total effects of the crisis are 
felt much through weaker commodity prices. This has helped net importers of the Far 
East products to enjoy favourable terms of trade gains, while net exporters (the Asian 
Countries) are negatively affected on growth and on current account and fiscal 
positions that will be significant in majority cases. 
Table 3.5: Far East economic data, 1994. 
Country GDP in 1994 (US$ mn) Annual GDP growth, 1990-1994 (%) 
Japan 4,396,000 1.1 
China 538,000 10.1 
Korea 333,00 7.6 
Taiwan 222,000 6.5 
Indonesia 146,000 6.8 
Thailand 124,000 8.8 
Hong Kong 118,000 4.9 
Malaysia 64,000 8.7 
Singapore 56,000 8.3 
Philippines 55,000 1.8 
Source: Financial Times Energy Publishing. 
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As a result the crisis has prompted bankruptcies, rising unemployment and falling 
wages and living standards. Private foreign and domestic capital investment has 
deteriorated and there are evident declines in asset values. Economic growth 
estimates have been revised, with the largest downward revisions for Indonesia, 
South Korea and Thailand- the three most affected economies. By 1998 the 
Japanese growth was zero, while South Korea it slid down to -0.8%. 
Japan's medium-term outlook has deteriorated further. Its economic weakness will 
delay economic turnaround in the Far Eastern region where it is the biggest foreign 
investor and a key export market. In spite of the measures that have been taken to 
address the financial sector problems and to support domestic demand, overall 
activity is now stagnant in 1998. Therefore further economic measures are needed to 
bring about an early resumption of growth. 
In contrast, China has been relatively immune to contagion from the crisis, partly 
because its capital inflows consist primarily of direct investment. Although the real 
effective exchange rate has been affected as a result of the deprecations in the 
region, but the trade positions remains strong, with large international reserves. 
However growth slowed moderately to 8.4% in 1998 from 9.2 in 1997 owing to 
weakening domestic demand and more difficult international environment However 
China may decide to devaluate its currency in order to with stand competition against 
other Asian countries. 
30 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Figure 3.2: Far East economic growth up to 1994. 
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The root cause of the crisis is largely attributed to self made problems, including 
regional financial sector weaknesses, offering bad debts, poor control of risks and lax 
enforcement of prudential rules, and delays in implementing structural reforms 
needed to reinvigorate the economy. Of late there is compressed investment and 
consumption in order to improve trade positions. This will however help to offset the 
domestic demand although output will still be expected to decline. 
Another view of seeing the crisis is the expected reduction of inflationary pressures 
by weakening demand and activity in many countries. This will cause a sharp drop of 
world prices for many primary commodities, which the Asian countries have a 
significant share of global demand. The large depreciation of a number of currencies 
will however reduce the US dollar prices of those products for which the Asian 
countries are important world suppliers. 
This argument goes even beyond reduced global inflationary pressures that the world 
economy could slide into the risk of deflation. The excess capacity in some industries 
reflects the effects of over-investment. Japan for example may already be facing the 
threat of consumer price deflation in the circumstances where confidence and 
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domestic demand are very weak- typically linked to financial sector weaknesses and 
sharp declines in asset prices. 
Apart from bad trade balances and weak commodity prices many emerging 
economies are suffering reduced capital flows and loss of funding by private 
investors. The implementation of strong adjustment measllres will ease currency 
deprecations and slow the growth of domestic demand. The adjustment process will 
reduce demand for imports from North America and Western Europe and contribute 
to the expansion of exports thereby fostering a rapid external adjustment. It will also 
reduce direct investment (in Europe and North America) from Asian companies in 
financial difficulty. 
3.6 Africa and the Developing World 
Developing countries' economic growth has exceeded Industrial countries' growth 
throughput about three decades ago despite the recent Asian financial crisis. 
However, with the fast recovery of Asian countries the importance of developing 
countries in the global economy can be expected to continue to increase in the years 
ahead. 
Similarly prospects for Africa are brighter than for many years. Political developments 
in South Africa, Mozambique and Angola provide something to build on. As a result 
investment into the countries has been on the increase to support economic growth. 
Apart from that the continued involvement of the IMF in providing fundamental 
economic reforms in developing countries, the strengthening of demand in 
industrialised countries and the possible recovery of commodity prices, should all 
help- to bolster the developing economies and improve the exporting countries' terms 
of trade. High cost~of production in developed economies and some Asian countries 
would provide a chance for Africa to be able to attract global foreign investment 
inflows and increase its share of world merchandise activity. 
But such improvements are relative. R_evised growth in 1997 decreased from 3.75% 
to 3.25%. This is largely attributable to the impact on a number of countries of 
adverse weather conditions and declines in commodity prices, and a few cases of 
political confrontations. Another reason being that the sub-Sahara Africa have the 
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highest ratio of external debt to GOP of any developing country region. There is little 
private capital attracted and as a result the region is heavily reliant on government 
and institutional sources for financing as can be seen in Figure 3.3. This reflects on 
low growth prospects of the region. The political and economic instability obviously 
makes returns on investment uncertain. 
Examples of a few economies are; Kenya: growth retarded partly as a re~ult of 
financial markets pressures related to political uncertainty. South Africa: (refer to the 
next session) slowed to 1.7% in 1997 from 3.25% in 1996 reflecting both domestic 
and external demand. Nigeria: growth was close to 5% in 1997, but economic activity 
has been affected by power and fuel shortages. The investment climate in Nigeria 
has remained unfavourable, however its readmission into the Commonwealth 
League accompanied with changes to democratic rule will raise prospects for 
economic growth for 1999. Algeria: growth slowed significantly in 1997 owing to the 
adverse impact of drought on agriculture that caused further delays in the recovery of 
the industrial activity . . 
Table 3.6: (a) Growth League for Sub-Sahara Africa (% GOP) 
Fastest-Growing Countries 1996 1997 1998 
Angola 9.0 7.5 9.5 
Uganda 5.0 8.0 7.0 
Botswana 6.8 7.6 6.7 
Mauritius 5.8 5.0 5.5 
COte d'ivoire 6.5 6.0 5.0 
Ghana 5.2 5.0 5.0 
Namibia 3.0 4.5 5.0 
Source: IMF Ltd. 
3.6.1 The Asian Crisis and African Economies 
The Asian crisis has affected African countries in a number of ways, although its 
specific impact on economic growth and external accounts of Africa is difficult to 
quantify. However, combine with internal factors and other external shocks, such as 
the effects of EI Nino and a decline in commodity prices, the crisis in Asia has led to 
downward revision of the projected real GOP growth rate. For instance, sub-Sahara 
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Africa has suffered by nearly % of 1 % to about 4% real GOP in 1998, and an 
increase of some 2% points in the projected external current account deficit. 
Weakened demand in Asia and the consequent reduction in its imports, particularly 
of metals, fuels, and agricultural raw materials, which are important exports from sub-
Sahara countries, have compounded the decline in world commodity prices. As a 
result of the considerable gains in competitiveness of the affected Asian countries, 
African producers are likely to face increased competition in third-country markets. 
This may adversely affect manufactured exports from South Africa and textile exports 
from Mauritius and Zimbabwe. Apart from that the financial difficulties facing some 
Asian countries may slow the much-needed foreign direct investment flows to sub-
Sahara Africa. 
Looking ahead, growth performance in African countries is expected and will be 
achieved most by Angola, Uganda and Botswana (Table 3.6(a))- which are among 
the world's ten most fastest-growing economies. The countries participating in the 
IMF 's economic reform will continue to outperform the rest of the continent. GOP is 
growing and inflation is reducing (Table 3.7); trade liberalisation and realistic 
exchange rates will be a pre-requisite to greater private sector investment. 
Table 3.6: (b) Growth League: Sub-Sahara Africa (%GDP) 
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Table 3.7: Sub-Sahara Africa Consumer Price Inflation 
Angola 1,650.0 1,650.0 1,200.0 
Uganda 7,7 8.0 7.0 
Botswana 10.1 9.0 10.0 
Mauritius 6.6 8.5 8.0 
Cote d'ivoire 3.5 5.0 3.5 
Ghana 34.0 28.0 25.0 
Namibia 8.0 9.8 10.0 
South Africa 7.4 8.7 6.5 
Zimbabwe 21.4 20.0 25.0 
Gabon 3.8 4.1 3.0 
Kenya 9.0 12.5 11 .5 
N ria 29.3 15.0 18.0 
Source: IMF Ltd 
3.7 South Africa . 
Following international integration of the South African economy in 1994, most local 
goods and commodities reached attractive and competitive overseas markets. This 
resulted in sustained export growth and healthy net capital inflows to help improve 
investment confidence. Productivity growth also accelerated to 4.1 % in 1997 from an 
average of less than 1 % in the 1980s, 2% in the early 1990s, 3.3% in 1995, and 
3.6% in 1996. In. 1997 the South African economy entered in its sixth year of 
expansion since the economic slump of the early 1990s. Total output has increased 
by 14.9%, about 8.9% higher than the previous peak in 1989. 
Real GOP growth rate was 1.7% for 1997 compared to 3.4% for 1995 and 3.2% for 
1996. The lower growth is ascribed to the slowdown in gross domestic expenditure 
(GOE) from 2.7% in 1996 to 1.4% in 1997. In particular, the decline in private 
consumption growth as well as a sizeable decumulation of inventories outweighed 
the positive contribution to GOP from improved export performance. South Africa's 
inventory stock has followed a downward trend similar to that experienced in 
industrialised countries. The decline is expected to moderate and reflect positively in 
1999 and 2000. 
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Table 3.8: South Africa: GOP 
1995/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 
GOP (R billion) 556 613 669 734 810 
Real GOP growth 3 1.7 3 4 5 
GOP Inflation 8.5 8.5 6 5,.5 5 
CPllnfiation 8.1 8 5.5 5.5 5 
Source: Budget Review 1998 
The weak consumption growth in 1997 was a result of higher interest rates, level of 
debts relative to disposal income and the negative wealth effects of weak prosperity. 
Comparatively, the real disposable income in 1995 and 1996 increased by 2.4% and 
4.2% respectively before sliding down to 0.8% in 1997. 
South Africa has experienced an increase in capital-output ratio (the volume of 
investment required to produce a given level of output) . This is due to the expansion 
of public sector investment (Figure 3.3) focussed on infrastructure development in 
order to stimulate the economy by supporting aggregate demand. Real investment by 
public authorities accelerated to an average growth rate of 15% in 1996 and 4% in 
1997 that has contributed to a general growth in all spheres of government 
investment spending. And this will continue to rise at an annual rate of over 5%. Real 
capital formation by public corporations increased by 5.3% in 1997, having risen by 
10.6% in 1996. 
However, there is a trend reflecting the slowdown of fixed capital formation in the 
agricultural and private manufacturing sectors. The GDFI by private business 
enterprises stood at 13.2% in 1995 went down to 6.1 % in 1996 and then 3.1 % in 
1997. This trend is expected to recover to 4.5% in 1998/99 as export opportunities 
expand and domestic demand recovers. Foreign direct investment continues to 
strengthen in response to prospects of higher growth rates in the Southern African 
region, financial markets reforms and exchange controls deregulation. 
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Since the beginning of the Asian financial crisis in the late 1997 consumer inflation in 
South Africa has shown a downward trend. It has remained within the 5-10% band 
since 1993 reflecting price stability and consumer confidence. This trend is expected 
to continue right through 2001 showing a relationship between exchange rate 
movements and PPI import prices. The recent interest rates reduction will stimulate 
demand. But the major thrust for South Africa is about strengthening its exports and 
private investment to contribute to stronger economic growth. 
Figure 3.3: South African Composition of Fixed Investment 
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Source: Budget Review 1998 
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3.8 Summary 
The current developments in the state of the world economy will certainly contribute 
to reduced economic activities and reverse the trade and economic balances. These 
imbalances emanate from the lack of GDP growth rates in many regions including 
Asia which used to be the world's most active region. The redirection of investment 
from the emerging and developing countries to developed economies, depressed 
commodity prices leading to the fall of the world price benchmark, amongst others, 
will suppress world demand. 
The major thrust hinges on Japan to salvage the battered economies of Asia in order 
to push for a speed recovery of the Asian industrial growth and output, and also 
attract foreign investment to re-create demand and balance out the Atlantic/Pacific 
economies. The current trend of one way export demand if it continues may result in 
a far reduced world volumes and trigger price deflation shocks in major markets, 
Japan, for example, has already started feeling the effects of consumer deflation. 
The emerging market economies in general have run the risk of financial fragility as 
experienced in the Far East, Russia and Brazil. Following the Asian financial crisis, 
capital investment has shifted away from emerging markets to mature market 
economies. The redirection of financial flows has helped to stimulate growth in 
developed economies, with the exception of Japan. As a result there has been a 
trend to cut interest rates and at the same time strengthening the major currencies in 
particular the US Dollar and the Pound sterling. 
Of all the emerging economies, South Africa, despite its depressed demand, has 
maintained sound economic and financial positions; with the Rand commanding 
highs against both the dollar and pound sterling. This trend would lead to reduced 
interest rates and promote domestic consumption. There are however economic 
problems and these include the lack of employment creation and the lack of private 
sector investment growth. The privatisation programme may result in the private 
sector capital redeployment and create employment. A relatively low inflation and 
high consumption would stimulate import demands and foreign capital investment for 
1999 and into the new millennium. 
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The Asian crisis together with recent commodity price movements Will bring about 
some large adjustments in external positions. It is important that countries whose 
external balances deteriorate, do not impose barriers to trade or allow competitive 
currency deprecations. For example, Malaysia has cut off all its economic ties with 
the world, while Zimbabwe faced with depleted foreign currency reserves and weak 
_ domestic currency has also introduced high import tariffs to fend off foreign payments 
in order to rebuild its foreign currency reserves. Such defensive reactions would be 
counter productive, slowing the adjustment process of the countries in the crisis and 
impairing growth world-wide. 
Many areas of the developing world have major social, political and infrastructural 
problems, which are a severe handicap to economic growth. Continuing instability is 
likely to limit the amount of inward investment they can attract. These regions are the 
most under-developed of merchandise markets and offer considerable potential for 
high growth rates, frorn a low initial volume base. As a result any reasonable degree 
of political and economic -stability should result in their share of global activity 
increasing despite the inherent risk of market fluctuations in annual performance. 
To conclude, the current state of the world economy together with the on-going 
phases of the merchandise strategies, support the eventual philosophy that could 
offer reduced costs and a fairly return on capital could be the joint venture, whether 
international or national. The theoretical joint venture of South Africa could however 
serve a multi-facetted purpose that include; (a) defending the North-South market 
which many lose making container owners have recently targeted as a prospecti"e 
market; (b) enrich the nation through foreign currency earnings and savings; and (c) 
stabilise the prospects of national and international investment. 
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SECTION FOUR 
4. CONTAINER TRADE AND MARKETS 
4.1 Global Merchandise Trade 
Prior to the Asian crisis of 1997/98 sea borne trade was growing at a steady rate. 
The United Nations estimates of 1994 show a total annual sea borne trade of 4,458 
million tonnes. Of which oil/gas cargoes made up around 45%, dry bulk cargo was at 
37% and the general cargo made up 18%, which is about 800 million tonnes. The 
general cargo includes reefers, heavy lift, ro-ro trailers, break bulk and containers. Of 
the general cargo, containers accounted for about 334 million tonnes, which 
represent about 7.5% of the international cargoes by weight and about 59.6% in 
value. 
In 1996 the Drewry estimates also provided a total sea borne trade of 4,700 million 
tonnes. Oil/gas cargoes were at 2,118 million tonnes (45%), dry bulk at 1,750 million 
tonnes (37%), and the general cargoes were about 18% (about 846 million tonnes), 
of which container trades recorded 386 million tonnes. There was a real growth of 50 . 
million tonnes in container trades. While the rate of general cargo trades growth is 
forecast to reach 900 million tonnes by the turn of the century, this increase will be 
largely seen in container market penetration, which was rising at 2% annually before 
the Asian crisis. In addition to that container penetration to other cargoes could reach 
an average rate of 54% by the beginning of the 21 st century despite the short-term 
interruption posed by the Asian crisis. In the long-term container trade will be driven 
by economic growth rates from the emerging economies, creating more cargo and 
greater transhipment. .. ~_ .... ~. 
In another move, the trend in the 1980s/90s shows a significant shift of regional 
distribution of the container trade to the East from the Western economies. As a 
result the Pacific Rim regions of South East Asia and the Far East increased their 
share of the global market from under 25% in 1980 to over 44% in 1996. This 
elevated Hong Kong and Singapore to the summit of the world container throughput, 
leaving the traditional giants like Rotterdam and New York way behind. Currently 
almost half of the world's containership trade is in the transpacific rim. 
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Similarly, Africa's increasing market share since the first half of 1990s has been 
reflected in the development of the Mediterranean transhipment in Egypt and the 
economic integration of the South African market after the trade embargo. This is 
largely a correlation of direct trade and regional hubbing over Durban that can be 
seen in Table 4.1. West Africa's share of the continental activity fell from30% in 1990 
to 19% in 1995. East African volumes also dropped in market share from 17% to 
14%. However Southern and Northern African volumes and market share increased 
from (30-32%) and (22-34%) respectively. The growth in volumes/market share and 
lack of competition has attracted some of the major containership players from the 
traditional WEST-EAST markets to the NORTH-SOUTH markets. 
Table 4.1: Degree of Containerisation in Africa: Selected Port (%) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Abidjan 37.1 41.1 38.3 38.4 38.0 44.7 
39.6 43.1 57.7 62.1 54.7 64.8 
45.7 47.3 49.5 42.0 37.8 ---
54.8 53.9 51.2 49.4 43.0 56.3 
41 .5 42.5 40.8 44.4 44.4 59.9 
Port Sudan 24.1 25.8 29.3 23.6 30.3 
Source: ISL Bremen 
4.1 .1 The Effects of Globalisation on Container Trade 
Globalisation made a double impact in the recovery of the world trade volumes and 
high growth rates since the economic slump of the early 1990s. Large amounts of 
capital investment moved into developing countries which subsequently led directly 
to increased trade as can be seen in Figure 4.1 and Table 4.2. Despite the recent re-
direction of capital to mature markets following the Asian crisis there is an enormous 
potential still to be tapped in most parts of Africa; China and the South East Asia 
(Vietnam, Indonesia, etc); India and Brazil. These countries move toward continued 
rise in container traffic trades. Currently the performance of Africa and Latin America 
has improved markedly despite the problems related to currency devaluation. 
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Figure 4.1: World Merchandise Trade and Output (Annual % Change) 
Source: Wond Trade <?rganisation 0NTO) 
Production and sourcing by the mult-national corporations has also contributed to this 
rise in container cargoes. Liberalisation of investment climate in South Africa, and 
other regions such as Latin America, Eastern Europe, Central Asia and China, where 
the concept of free trade has been embraced, has reduced barriers to capital 
movements, consequently, these countries have experienced growing volumes of 
container trade and hence economic growth despite the inherent failures to defend 
themselves against the pressures of globalisation. 
Figure 4.2GDP and Countries Volumes (% Share of 1995 Global Total) 
Source: Drewry Ltd. 
Figure 4.2 shows a relative correlation between GOP and countries volumes in the 
majority of the regions and more significant in developing countries. The scenario in 
West Europe and North America shows a more similar trend where GOP are higher 
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than volumes, while trade volumes are higher than GOP for the Far East and South 
East Asia. 
Table 4.2 World Output and Trade (Annual % Change) 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
World Output 2.4 3.7 3.5 3.8 4.1 
Industrial Countries 0.9 2.8 2.1 2.3 2.5 
USA 2.3 3.5 2.0 2.4 2.3 
Japan 0.1 0.5 0.9 3.5 2.7 
Germany -1.1 2.9 1.9 1.3 2.4 
France -1 .3 2.8 2.2 1.3 2.4 
Italy -1.2 2.2 3.0 1.1 2.2 
UK 2.1 3.9 2.5 2.2 3.0 
Canada 2.2 4.1 2.3 1.4 3.2 
Developing Countries 6.3 6.6 5.9 6.3 6.2 
Africa 0.9 2.9 3.0 5.0 5.0 
Asia 8.7 9.1 8.6 8.0 7.5 
Mid East &Europe 4.2 0.5 3.6 3.9 3.3 
Western Hemisphere 3.2 4.7 0.8 3.0 3.0 
Countries in Transition -8.5 -8.8 -1.3 0.4 4.0 
World Merchandise Trade Vol. 3.9 9.5 9.1 6.4 7.1 
Source: IMF Oct.1996 
4.1.2 Merchandise and the General Cargo Volumes 
The general cargo volumes maintained a constant average rate of 2.7% over a 
period of a decade during the 1980s. In the early 1990s, general cargo volume 
growth hovered between the 4 to 5% band per annum in response to the world 
economic depression. The merchandise trade (essentially container trade) has grown 
much faster than both the total general cargo market and world industrial output as 
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can be seen in Figures 4.1 and Table 4.2. The phenomenon of globalisation of world 
production (essentially decentralised production and trade liberalisation) will intensify 
the effect of container trade. Comparatively between 1950 and 1995 the world output 
rose by 4% per annum, while merchandise trade increased at about 6% per annum. 
This implies that output multiplied six times while trade increased by almost fourteen 
fold. 
4.1.3 Merchandise Cargo and Container Boxes 
Figure 4.3: Growth of World Container Trade to 1996 
Source: Container Internatinal Yearbook 
Figure 4.3 shows container boxes growth, measured by number of port handling 
moments, loaded and empty, including transhipment. The growth rate of 
containerised cargo has been slightly lower than that of port handling activity. This 
could have been affected by certain incidence of transhipment and empty containers 
but generally the average rate of container cargo showed a modest figure of 8.2% 
per annum up to 1996. 
4.2 Container Penetration 
The share of the general cargo market moving in containers has more than doubled 
since 1980. In 1995 estimates showed around 44% of the general cargo carried in 
containers and Drewry forecast that with that trend the rate would be above 53% by 
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the turn of the century as can be seen in Figure 4.4. However experts in 
containership believe that penetration into other cargo market will reach a ceiling 
range of between 65-70%, which represents the upper limit. They also suggest that 
containerisation is unlikely beyond this limit on the grounds of either cargo size or of 
economics. Contrary to that view containerisation is in excess of 90% in developed 
economies especially between the principal OECD economies. At the same time 
containerisation in developing countries is at much lower degree. 
Figure 4.4 Containerisation and General Cargo (million tonnes) to 2000 
Source: Drewry Shipping ~~~~~I!~!:lts Lt~ 
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A further penetration of the general cargo trades by containers will be a significant 
ingredient in the expansion of container trades. There are a number of cargo owners 
enjoying the adventure and benefits of efficiency and sophistication provided by 
container shipping. A large proportion of reefer cargoes have recently found their 
easy conformity with refrigerated containers. This provides reefer shippers flexible 
times, organisation and planning systems despite the fact that container space is 
relatively smaller than reefer carriers. 
Reduction of the aged general cargoship fleet will force more neo/break bulk cargoes 
into containers. However the greatest potential for further unitisation of general cargo 
is in Africa, some South East Asian countries, China, South America and the Indian 
sub-continent, where routes are still served by non-unitised vessels. These areas all 
share a requirement for major investment in container port facilities, although 
volumes may retard the unitisation process. This is however a deciding factor in 
driving foreign direct investment to such countries in order to develop a sophisticated 
port infrastructure. 
A recent phenomenon behind container market growth is the increasing transhipment 
as a result of a comprehensive feeder network created by global or mega carriers. 
This is significant of most carriers' global route portfolios, particularly in Asia, 
European and Caribbean regions. While several most rapidly developing container 
markets have limited port facilities and are inconvenient relative to main vessel 
routings, South Africa has managed to see itself in the global routings. Durban port, 
for instance, is largely dependant on hub connections into both regional and global 
network. 
4.3 Southern African Containership Trade 
4.3.1 Imports and Exports 
Following the re-admission of South African economy to the international market, the 
sub-African region has seen a rise in trade volumes. This has also enhanced the 
chances of regional integration, as there is increased intra-regional trade. Kenya for 
instance, has developed an active trading partner to South Africa, with exports to 
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Kenya increasing over 400% since 1994. Tanzania has also proved an attractive new 
market for South Africa. 
Table 4.3: SA CARGO HANDLED- Total Tonnage 1995-1997 
209,449 457,985 416,331 
3,250,665 2 ,822,086 3,391,449 
3,876,081 2,828,056 5,593,980 
587,804 533,949 435,226 
11,644,491 0,074 13,064,090 
Source: Portnet Statistics 
Figure 4.5: SA Average Cargo Handled-Total Tonnage Between (1995-1997) 
Source: Portnet Data 
Statistics shows an upturn in South Africa volumes in container trade in 1997. This is 
attributable to import flows, as a result of the firm Rand exchange rate against major 
currencies. High container volumes have also contributed to the development of 
Durban as a regional hub/relay port. High import volumes is also partly a result of the 
sub-Sahara region being heavily dependent upon comparatively few export products, 
which are predominantly dry-bulk and break cargo. It is however export growth which 
both South Africa and the continent as a whole requires. 
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Figure 4.6: Number of Vessel Arrivals (Ocean Going) 1995-997 
Source: Portnet Data 
Figure 4.7: SA Tonnage of Imports & Exports (1995-1997) 
o Balance 
ClTotal 
1995 
Source: Portnet Data 
4.3.2 Southern Africa and Trade Liberalisation 
For the past two decades there has been significant development towards 
liberalisation of markets and reduction of protectionist policies in many regions of the 
world. This has been exerted by the IMF, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and 
the World Bank to help open up markets especially in the developing economies. The 
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which 
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preceded the WTO, has taken trade liberalisation many steps ahead. As a result the 
World Banks estimates based on weighted basis showed tariffs on industrial goods 
falling from 6.3% to 3.7% by 1996. Regulations, which govern many export 
merchandise including textiles and clothing will be eliminated over a period of ten 
years since the early 1990s. Tariffs on information technology have also been 
reduced. Accordingly Industrialised countries will abolish many tariff structures by the 
year 2000, although some developing countries have been granted exemption to 
2005. 
This package will apply to all commodities and merchandise across the board, 
including financial services, maritime transport and telecom services. However 
according to the World Bank study of 1996 protectionist policies in the sub-Sahara 
were costing up to US$11 billion per annum in lost exports earnings. The region's 
global share of exports declined from 3.1 % in 1955 to 1.2% in 1990 as a result of 
inappropriate domestic policies. High import tariffs feed through into exports costs by 
raising the cost of essential imports such as agricultural inputs and machinery. 
By 1996 the sub-Sahara import tariffs averaged 26.8%, more than three times higher 
than the Asian tigers (before the crisis), and more than four times the OECD average 
of 6.1 %. During the Uruguay Round the OECD nations reduced their tariffs by over 
40%, many Asian countries made concessions, and Africa's barriers remained 
unchanged, thus increased the spread between Africa's tariffs and other nations. 
South Africa in particular, through its strategy of moving from the import-substitution 
to an open economy approach, has decommissioned many tariff structures, in some 
cases reduced them to below GATT-binding levels and liberalised trade in line with 
the model of_market forces. Th~ strategy Iesultedln a dramatic development, putting 
significant competitive pressure on South African industry by forcing then to meet 
international standards. There has been an improvement in the current account as a 
result of strong performance in merchandise exports, which grew by 12% in volume 
and 21.5% in value by 1997. Beside merchandise, improved performance has also 
been broadly based by large increases in mining and manufactured goods. 
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However many countries in Africa have responded well to the calls of globalisation-
the movement of the industry from traditional high cost production areas to regions 
with a much lower wage base. This move has already taken big strides to Southeast 
Asia, China, India and Central America, thus pouring FDI into t.hese areas in order to 
undertake low-tech manufacturing that can be a fraction of the costs in industrialised 
nations. African countries have the prospects for establishment of new manufacturing 
base, which is export oriented and this will result in dramatic effects on the volumes 
of containerised cargo. 
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SECTION FIVE 
5. CONTAINERSHIP SUPPLY AND MARKETS 
5. 1 World Container Supply 
Since its inception in the 1960s the container sector has been the fastest growing 
category of the world fleet. From the economic slump of the early 1990s to 1996 
capacity growth was an average of 7% per annum. Of the container fleet the cellular 
type were growing fastest at around 15% as can seen in the Table 5.1 and Figure.5.1 
Table 5.1: Development of the World Containership Fleet 
Cellular Non-Cellular Total Cellular 
Fleet Fleet Fleet Share (%) 
('000 teu) ('000 teu) ('000 TEU) _ 
1986 1,330 1,241 2,571 51 .7 
1987 1,416 1,307 2,723 52.0 
1988 1,516 1,353 2,869 52.8 
1989 1,624 1,397 3,021 53.8 
1990 1,755 1,413 3,168 55.4 
1991 1,913 1,460 3,373 56.7 
1992 2,098 1,512 3,610 58.1 
1993 2,217 1,526 3,743 59.2 
1994 2,532 1,570 4,102 61_7 
1995 2,761 1,647 4,408 62.6 
1996 3,179 1,655 4,834 65.8 
Source: Containerisation International Yearbook 
According to Drewry Consultants (March 1997) the cellular share of total capacity 
reached a historical high point of about 68% by beginning of 1997. On a comparative 
basis the cellular are less active in fleet size category up to 1,000 teus, where semi-
containership and ro-ro provide the largest vessel slots. Above the level of 1,000 teu 
cellular vessels provide a significant share of total slot capacity, and are most 
dominant in the category above 2,000 teus. 
5.1.1 Post Panamax Vessels 
The most stimulating fact of the containerisation is the vessel upsizing in capacity. 
Upsizing has achieved economies of scale and thus triggered increased rate of 
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transhipment. Since the first quarter of the 1990s shipowners rushed to press orders 
of large tonnage and some were in excess of 7,000 teus in capacity. Although this 
was believed to be the summit of containerisation, the much published 8,000 and 
10,000 teus and the planned 15,000 teus may be built. 
Figure 5.1: World Containership Fleet Development, Annual Change (%) 
Source: Containerisation International Yearbook 
o Tatal 
Fleet 
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The giant vessels have economic and operational constraints. Firstly they will have a 
knock effect on bunker prices because of higher fuel consumption. Secondly their 
inability to pass through the Panama Canal provides an operational inflexibility. In 
addition larger vessels are more susceptible to adverse wave reaction and their 
deeper draught presents them with difficulties in approaching terminals because not 
many approach channels offer more than 15 metres water depth. These vessels 
therefore present more costs and provide limited operational flexibility. For the same 
reasons there will be a global slowing down in orders for larger vessels. 
Apart from that their potential to impact upon the North-South markets at a wider 
scale may be limited. Beside South Africa and Australia, there are few ports, which 
are either able to handle vessels of more than 2,500 teu or gearless vessels with 
complete confidence. Therefore there is a fairly impenetrable barrier in the short-term 
to potential deployment of 3,000 teu vessels into several important North-South 
markets. Ports privatisation and liberalisation undertaken in many countries that may 
eliminate the infrastructural barriers to large vessels to be commended. 
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Container fleet is comparatively young- less than 15 years for the cellular vessels, 7 
years for 3,000 teu+ panamax vessels and less than 4,5 years for post panamax 
types. Because of the youthful age average of the container fleet scrapping has 
played a minimal role up to date. A small percentage of the aged tonnage have 
become uncompetitive, high rate of fuel consumption, high maintenance cost and 
suffer from size constraints due to high volume requirement. But well maintained 
vessels of over 20 years of age are still attractive to the sales and purchase market 
despite their operational disadvantages. 
The development of new regional markets has continually offered new deployment 
opportunities for the older tonnage, as they have become too small for their original 
trades. This development has allowed fleet growth and upsizing of vessel capacity. 
And the older tonnage that might have been considered for scrapping have instead 
found new trading areas. In addition the delivery of massive new tonnage to the 
West-East markets together with the Asian crisis will stimulate transfer of extra 
tonnage to the North-South trades. Already some large carriers such as Maersk, 
Evergreen, the Mediterrenean Shipping Company (MSC), etc have moved a vast 
tonnage into South Africa-Europe, East and West Africa-Europe, West-South Africa-
East trades. 
5.2 The Order Book 
By 1996 the container order book had about 1 million teu, which was about 31 % of 
the cellular fleet. These fleet are currently feeding into the market and may cause 
hick-ups as they could not be immediately absorbed due to the Asian crisis. The 
beginning of a new cycle after the crisis, helped by the container penetration of the 
general cargo, will help traffic volumes and capacity. 
However the majority of this additional capacity is cellular, 'which is intrinsically more 
productive than other types of container carrying vessels. About 45% of cellular slots 
entering the market are in the 3,500 teu vessel category, reflecting an influx of new 
capacity on most competitive container routes of the West-East trades, which are 
most affected by the'Asian crisis. 
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Table 5.2: Delivery Schedule, Cellular Containership Orderbook (TEU) 
<999 52 23 
1,000-1,999 129 105 
2,000-2,999 130 111 
3,000-4,499 111 92 
4,500+ 161 145 
Total 583 476 
Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants LTD, 1997 
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The significant growth of employment in the North-South trades and the sail pace 
improvements in port facilities are promoting greater investment in the 2-3,000 teu 
category. But in some places, most of these markets continue to demand geared 
tonnage, and thus limiting the upsizing trend. However as the demand for larger 
tonnage in the North-South markets grows in the near future, operators will be 
required to deploy geared vessels. 
The long-term market outlook may not favour the small size range, as there is a 
significant reduction in market share for that range of vessel sizes. This is caused by 
carriers requirement for upsized vessels, which can achieve scale economies in 
times of high volumes. The short-term outlook for 1998 delivery will decelerate the 
growth of slot, as cellular capacity continues to increase much faster than total fleet 
slot. According to Drewry Consultants the cellular total space will account for 72% of 
the fleet by end of the century compared to 55% a decade earlier. The short-term 
implication will have adverse effects on the supply/demand balance. Scrapping of 
tonnage at a conservative rate may not help achieve the equilibrium unless the 
market forces small and cash flow strapped players. 
5.3 Supply/Demand Balance 
The Asian crisis has thrown the container trade into disarray, as it had moved 
towards maturity before the second half of 1997. Fleet development and cargo 
volumes had kept pace with each other, closing the gap between supply and cargo 
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demand. The first large containerised vessels were absorbed swiftly with cargo 
volumes commanding high premiums. 
Figure 5.2: Container Market Supply/Demand Balance to 2000 
Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd, 1997 
o Moves per 
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The menace of the Asian crisis met with the large-scale vessel deliveries resulted in 
over capacity and consequential lower commodity prices. The intra-Asia trade has 
been hit the most by reduced regional purchasing power. High cargo volumes are 
mostly westbound and larger numbers of empties eastbound. The introduction of the 
post panamax vessels have resulted in reduced feeder network as they could cover 
more ports at the same time phasing out regional and small niche tonnage. 
5.4 Container Markets 
5.4.1 Container Trade Routes 
Before the Asian crisis the global market was reaching towards maturity, with 
demand/supply balance less erratic as shown by traffic volumes in Figure 5.3. 
Volatility was generally observed at individual route level and usually as a product of 
specific vessel sizes/types in the charter market. This is so because each route and 
each vessel type has its own supply/demand dynamics, and usually doesn't move 
hand in hand with the world market. The prevailing situation demands container lines 
to vigorously pursue new routes and markets. Competition for some few years ago 
was only relevant for the West-East trade routes, but today the effects of 
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globalisation and the Asian crisis present a new level of competition even in the 
North-South trades. 
Figure 5 3 Container Traffic Volumes, 1996 
The Asian crisis followed the deployment of large containerships, which had already 
introduced a disproportionate tonnage on major routes including the transpacific, 
transatlantic and European-Far East markets. Large vessels were not replacements 
but additional capacity and therefore took away a substantial cargo demand from the 
smaller container vessels. In this case relief will only accrue to these trade routes 
when existing tonnage is displaced to other routes. But large vessels together with 
the international economic vagiaries have made many of the container trade routes 
experience a significant lower turnover. 
5.4.1.1 The Transpacific Market 
Table 5.3 Transpacific Trade- Forecast Supply/Demand Balance to 2000 
MTEU 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
3.92 
4.23 
4.88 
5.41 
5.68 
5.82 
5.96 
Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd 
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4.52 
4.72 
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5.07 
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The transpacific route, the world's largest market has been affected by the collapse 
of some Asian currencies, which has exacerbated the already permanent feature of 
trade imbalance to a large degree. Exports to North America from the Far East and 
Southeast Asia have gone up by 19.0% during the third quarter of 1998, while 
exports plunged by the same amount. A soaring demand for Asian products means a 
high demand for containers in the Asian region. Similarly the drop in the Asian 
imports from the West implies that few containers are returning to Asia, therefore 
deteriorating the eastbound vessel utilisation. This has created both logistical and 
equipment shortages and carriers are forced to incur larger costs to reposition empty 
containers. 
If lower eastbound growth persists, carriers will be forced to adjust supply more 
closely to demand. Some service savings could be withdrawn as a reaction to the 
mismatch between deliveries and the rate of trade expansion. This would require 
some lines or groups to unilaterally accept an inevitable loss of market share and 
service levels. 
5.4.1.2 The Transatlantic Market 
Table 5.4: Transatlantic Trade-Forecast Supply/Demand Balance to 2000 
(M TEU) 
2.15 2.15 69.3 69.3 
2.17 2.17 71.4 71.4 
2.20 2.20 73.2 73.2 
2.31 2.31 72.3 72.3 
2.43 2.43 70.4 70.4 
Source; Drewry Shipping Consultants 
In a complete contrast, the transatlantic trade route has seen slot growth to about 
7.3% in 1996, from the average rate of 1.4% per annum since 1992. This was when 
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the global cellular containership fleet rose by 65%. The route looks immune to the 
forces of external or global pressures through carrier discipline and cohesion. In view 
of the dramatic cargo growth the transatlantic has become a stable and improving 
trade which has been characterised by responsive tonnage and pragmatism. 
5.4.1.3 The Europe-Far East Market 
The route enjoyed a brief period of very high space utilisation in the early 1990s. 
Since then watershed operators on the route found that it was very difficult to match 
capacity growth with trade growth in an expanding market. Consequently, westbound 
utilisation rates tumbled, and have only been compensated for by an improvement in 
the eastbound trade. An annual westbound trade growth of 6% is overwhelmed by 
capacity growth of 11 % per annum. According to Drewry Shipping forecast an 
average utilisation is to decline below 70% on the headhaul westbound leg, which 
cannot be viewed as a sustainable position for operators. 
Table 5.5: N. Europe-Far East- Forecast Supply/Demand Balance to 2000 
(M TEU) 
2.15 71 .6 75.4 
2.42 3.21 68.6 71 .0 
2.62 3.49 68.7 69.3 
2.88 3.84 67.4 66.7 
3.00 4.00 70.0 67.8 
3.90 3.12 4.16 57.9 72.4 69.2 
Source; Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd . 
This implies that carriers will need to look for some form of westbound capacity 
management, although it is difficult to foresee how such arrangements can ever 
again be acceptable to the European Union. However it could be important to note 
that while the transpacific and Europe-Far East markets face a period of turbulence 
in which rising volumes are outpaced by capacity growth, the North Atlantic trade 
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expect to continue along its comparatively stable course. The supply/demand 
improvement has much to do with a regulated commercial environment. . 
With West-East trades under such considerable pressure, and with vacant space 
mounting on the routes to and from Asia, the urge to supplement main trade lifting 
with ancillary and wayport trades will intensify. Thus Europe-Far East trade ships will 
increasingly target such wayport areas as the Mediterranean, Red Sea, Arabian Gulf, 
and India while transhipment focus will include Africa, Australia and New Zealand. In 
1996 it was evident with Maersk alone connecting North-South services which are 
clearly intended to siphon traffic onto their axial trade vessels- especially the cargo 
hungry 6,000 teu+ ships. Maesrk's new wayport routes include New Zealand-
Singapore; Dubai-East Africa; and Algeciras-South Africa. To a certain extent each of 
these wayport routes can be seen as trade in its own right and the capability is 
significant. 
The above picture foreshadows even greater competition for direct North-South 
trades from transhipment services along the axial routes. The Europe-Far East trade 
being particularly threatening the predominantly North-South carriers because of the 
wide spread of other markets it can impact. However some experts argue that North-
South trades are relatively well protected against transhipment incursion by 
geographic boundaries, for example the South Africa-Far East or Europe-ECSA. But 
other routes are more exposed to triangulation, for example, the Far East-West or 
East Africa, and Europe and the Far East-WCSA. 
5.5 Globalisation and Mega-Carriers 
Global carriers are the result of consolidation phases of container operators into 
alliances, mergers and joint ventures, which have developed beyond traditional 
markets into new regions and new routes. The aim _ is to provide global service 
network and have extended the picture of mega-carrier domination on the EAST-
WEST routes. Their penetration of the NOTH-SOUTH markets has been a major 
feature of the 1990s. These markets have provided carriers with a chance to develop 
additional cargo that can be fed into their traditional WEST-EAST services as 
mentioned above, in order to fill the escalating number of mainline slots. Global 
carrier networks arJd pipelines have however been precluded by geographical, 
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operational and commercial factors. Over 21 mega carriers have expanded into 
North-South markets, with Maesrk's global network being the most developed and 
integrated route system. 
Key factors in global carrier have included: 
1. The limited (marginal) costs and synergy benefits of adding new 
routes to a global system, 
2. The potential to offer global services to major shippers 
3. The apparent softer competition and higher freight rates of many of 
the North-South trades, 
4. Increasing capacity liability on the EAST-WEST axis, at atime when 
capacity management programmes were limiting main trade lifting and 
cargo growth was also slowing. 
The success of the global carriers in Latin America and Africa has been helped much 
by the maritime deregulation in the 1990s. In addition to that the strategic impetus to 
expand into new markets was however most pressing. Privatisation, currency 
liberalisation (floating) and lower tariffs also made the North-South trades attractive 
to new carriers. For example, South Africa's boosted free trading environment, a 
more developed and sophisticated market infrastructure accord the global carrier 
requirements. South Africa's wayport location between the Far East and ECSA has 
been a major contributory factor in the intensification of competition, and this has 
served to accelerate its development as an important regional hub. 
In West and East African markets, there is a sharp contrast, which have seen a 
reduction in activity from the global carriers. Bureaucratic and regulatory controls, low 
volumes, poverty, inadequate infr(3stru~tlJre_ ~~~ the main causes of this as well as, 
logistical problems, markets with little demand for value added service and high 
volumes of non-containerised cargo. This has presented limited involvement of the 
global carriers integration into the North-South trades. In a way this will deny the 
areas competition, innovative and technological services although there is great 
potential. Despite the fact that the global carriers have threatened the viability of 
traditional carriers of the North-South trades, mega carriers create a climate of 
dynamism, which demands improvements to avoid loosing out in the market place. 
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5.6 Summary 
The North-South operators should push for new strategies in order to confront the 
mass arrival of the global carriers and tonnage redirected from over traded routes. 
There is need to develop a coherent strategic defences to exploit their specific 
advantages that include: local expertise, an established market presence and share, 
purpose-built tonnage, integrated organisations, which embrace agency, transport 
and stevedoring. This combination of advantages is necessary for service 
enhancement. 
The joint venture between Safmarine/CMBT in South and East Africa and with 
Delmas in West Africa is a positive development even though it is bogged with 
operational constraints arising from management differences. A more coherent 
strategy such as one undertaken in the study will accord the economies of scale and 
service cohesion. 
In the North-South trades where markets lack significant cargo growth or regulatory 
restrictions, frustrated business practices or where port facilities are rudimentary, the 
global carriers or new entrants have not been successful. Where the market 
resembles a scaled down version of the West-East routes, for instance South Africa, 
it_has been easier for them to make substantial shipments. Therefore the intention of 
this study is that the proposed joint venture should not be between locals and 
incoming global carriers or new entrants, because that trade off expertise with locals 
will be in danger when the jOint venture weakens or breaks up. This would leave the 
global carriers or new entrants being more confident in their position, and may no 
longer need a local partner. 
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SECTION SIX 
6 THE FREIGHT AND CHARTER MARKETS 
6.1 Market Rates 
Historically, the container trade growth was largely supportive of market rates 
especially during the late 1980s. The Asian region, being the strongest with massive 
increases in transhipment traffic, was highly supportive of rates for feeder vessels. 
The second half of 1990s saw market rates dropping in response to the arrival of 
large and tramp container operators which took most of the demand pressure off 
smaller sector vessels. This however meant that container charter rates were partly 
driven by global, regional and sectors supply/demand balances.-
In his discussion papers (317/318) Dr. Hans Boehme of the Kiel Institute of Global 
Shipping and Transport, reviewed the effects of the Asian crisis on market rates. 
Boehme discovered that market rates across the board during 1997 did not respond 
to the ocean global trade growth of over 5 billion tonnes, which was a result of strong 
economic growth. Rates dropped despite sufficient demand, and the weak bunker 
prices and the dollar exchange rate increase, all negatively influenced the market 
rates. One explanation could be that where trade growth has been at its highest, new 
operators are attracted to the market and stimulate a rate war with existing carriers 
who have market share to defend. As a result unit revenues in dollar terms are 
seriously harmed. However Boehme forecasted further charter rates weakening as 
this would be inevitable because there is considerable uncertainty about the duration 
and effects of the crisis in East and Southeast Asia. 
Therefore the crisis together with the continued stagnation of the Japanese economy 
will have dampening effects on the- glObal market rates with strong regional effects, 
which may not be compensated by the increasing demand for tonnage in China. In 
addition to that the effect of the continuing strong capacity expansion of the global 
merchant fleet, which already caused freight rates to drop before the crisis will have 
worsening effects. If the Asian exports continue at a high level, supply of slots will 
grow strongly, competition and pressure of rates will expand to the trades, which will 
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be affected. The considerable lower charter rates for the tramp container vessels will 
contribute their share to such development. 
Some experts have also suggested that the degree of rate erosion vary from route to 
route. The West-East markets have been under a permanent rate pressure for over 
two decades. The world's largest market of the West-East, the transpacific, has 
experienced dramatic collapses (in 1978, 1984, 1987, 1996 and 1998) and long-term 
revenue erosion. This evidence shows that the West-East trends may be permanent 
and that rates are not going back to historical levels, therefore the current market 
could be a new rate reality. Comparatively, many North-South markets have only 
experienced freight rates reduction during the 1990s mainly due to the elimination of 
protective measures following the pressures of globalisation and deregulation. This, 
- as a result, has exposed the North-South trades to the full force of competitive 
pressure. 
6.1.1 Containership and Rate Pricing 
Container carriers are caught between shippers' demand for more services at lower 
prices on one side and the vagaries of the international economy on the other. The 
trade imbalance in the West-East trade is a product of the fall of the Asian 
currencies, and has resulted in large numbers of empty containers shipped 
eastbound. The increase of $300 per 40 foot container on the eastbound side is an 
endeavour to cover the costs of container repositioning. At the same time carriers 
have dropped westbound rates to attract cargo and defray the costs of repositioning 
the empties. This has been adopted recently but may prevail longer than anticipated 
because the Asian economies have-not yet shown signs of early recovery. 
The above scenario describes an attempt to restore rates that have fallen far below 
levels of five years ago: But the Container industry is highly fragmented, and no 
individual carrier can exert much meaningful control over the pricing of its products. 
Attempts to exploit collective pricing power through conferences have become less 
convincing, both through a lack of internal carrier cohesion and through the more 
rigorous policing of the container shipping by regulators, who has for instance 
curtailed many of the anti-trust exemptions previously enjoyed by carriers. Therefore 
there is need to rise above conferences by formulating "discussion agreements", 
which include both conference and non-conference carriers. Discussion agreements 
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may address industrial and other market-related issues such as over-capacity, but 
have very limited power in setting specific rates. 
However co-operation among carriers is of crucial importance to maintaining rate 
levels although several factors work against such unity, and some of them are as 
follows: 
in 
The practice of taking independent action, which allows conference 
carriers to cut rates with or without the permission of other members, 
continues to push rates downward, 
Service contracts in which carriers agree to certain rates and service 
exchange for a shipper's volume commitment, have also led to non-
compensatory rates, 
The deregulation of the relationship between shippers and carriers by 
allowing confidential rates. Confidential contracts will on the other 
hand hasten the end of the conference system because of its failure 
to police freight rates, etc. 
However pricing of freight or charter. rates in the container industry could be 
manageable to a certain extent with the use of discussion agreements despite the 
fact that there are several factors that militate against them as pointed out. Through 
agreements the market rates will stabilise even though rates will not return to their 
original levels. 
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SECTION SEVEN 
7. REVENUE AND COST SAVING 
The container market has reflected a significant mismatch between the freight rates 
(revenue) and the cost of operating the industry. The negative operating margins 
have been largely a result of the industry's failure to restore the freight market. Over-
capacity is one of the factors caused by the super-size vessels, which arrived at the 
market some three years ago. This has meant huge additional vessel slots and has 
intensified competition, affecting the carriers' cost structure. The negative economic 
development of 1997/98, added to the underlying constraints will force out a large 
number of operators, who will switch investment to others sectors of less risk or quit 
shipping altogether. 
The theoretical black company including many other medium size and small carriers 
will be most affected, while larger carriers will not realise growth as return on capital 
only covers operating costs. At this stage costs have become carriers' number one 
enemy! A jOint venture co-operation can arguably be the way tofoIJow. Richard 
Murphy, the senior vice president of Sea-Land stated that, "managing what we have 
now in terms of optimising our cost base .... we want the highest quality .... with the 
lowest cost base for doing it." Sea-Land is one of the container joint ventures 
(although international in nature) that have achieved major savings through a 
consolidation strategy of merging the companies' marketing, capital and operations 
as can be seen in Table 7.1. 
7.1 Cost Reduction/Saving Strategies 
It is the purpose of this study to search for strategies that will make the South African 
container operators and many carriers survive and stay in the market. However, 
consolidation has been adopted although it has its weaknesses such as the eventual 
creation of bigger, stronger and fewer carrier groups. One of the minor strategies of 
reducing and saving fixed and variable costs could be a re-structuring process of the 
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administrative and operating systems. Restructuring is more of a reform strategy 
rather than allow carriers to expand the economies of scale. 
Restructuring has been used in many occasions in privatisation or corporatisation of 
government enterprises for cost effective and efficient use of resources. 
Restructuring has also been used in organisational re-engineering process 
rejuvenation of mature industries and innovative programs to slack off redundancy 
and create value for all interest groups in terms of low cost, quality, fashioning 
products and service, etc to meet market demands. However this has a direct effect 
on employees losing jobs and incomes. On the other hand this adds growth to 
investment in technological advancement. 
Through restructuring, organisations may reduce both variable and fixed costs, and 
move greater volumes of cargo through lower unit costs. However restructuring 
without consolidation may achieve nothing, but eventually face the same old factors 
of cost because of the general nature of the shipping industry. This alone may not be 
better to reduce capital investment demands and variable operating costs. This 
assertion implies that restructuring lies harmoniously in the armpits of consolidation. 
7.1.1 Consolidation and Cost Savings 
Table 7.1: Potential Benefits of Carrier Consolidation- A Hypothetical Case 
Study ($m) 
Current Alliance Merger/JV 
Operation 
Operating Revenue 3,492 3,492 6,984 
Operating Expenses 3,305 3,205 5,980 
of which Labour/Fringes 859 859 1,289 
Operating Income 187 287 1,004 
Margin Revenue 5.4 8.4 14.4 
Source: Drewry Shipping Consultants Ltd, 1997 
Table 7.1 provides a hypothetical example of merger/take-over or joint venture 
benefits (Drewry Shipping Consultants, p64, 1997) arising from economies of scale in 
administration. The assessment is based on Sea-Land's operational performance of 
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1994 and contrasts the scale of benefits achievable from an alliance arrangement 
with those potentially on offer through a full merger or joint venture· with similarly 
sized and similarly structured carrier. The case study assumes savings of $100 
million per annum achieved in operating costs in the case of an alliance and the 
merger/joint venture assuming administration costs are at 1.5 times of the two 
companies separately and retains all the cargo volumes. 
Drewry Shipping ConSUltants in 1997 proved that the merger/joint venture entity 
could deliver a 14.4% margin on revenue in view of the falling freight rates. Drewry 
also demonstrated that that potential profit could only be realised by a merger/take-
over or joint venture company even though market rates would not return back to 
original levels. This also shows that survival can be achieved in the container 
industry during hard times, but only through a more consolidated approach. 
Similarly the Anglo-Dutch incorporation between Safmarine and CMBT, eventually 
resulted in a major acquisition in 1998 and created a giant carrier in the North-South 
trades. The incoporation however suffered from different business ethics, cultural 
sensibilities and strategic visions that made a massive obstacle during the initial 
period. These are typical operational constraints faced by most cross-national joint 
venture, and are more prominent in alliances where companies maintain their 
marketing and administrative strategies outside the arrangement. One of the 
Safmarine/CMBT's weakest points was cost rationalisation, which can hardly be 
separated from the alliance arrangement and had questionable cost savings and 
hence profitability. 
Despite these constraints the Safmarine/CMBT incoporation realised a big change in 
1997 when it moved 500,000 TEU for the first time. During the same year the 
Safmarine Group through the container arrangement scooped a historical turn over of 
R8, 5 billion- an increase of 29%. In addition the incorporation created a dominant 
and competitive organisation that overcame the effects of weakening market rates in 
1997. However had this incorporation been a consolidated joint investment with a 
single marketing unit and a single brand name the initial financial year of operation 
would have realised margin on revenue comparable to the Sea-Land case study. 
This strengthens the point that a consolidated joint venture investment could be 
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superior, even though it needs the support of extra arrangements capable of 
reducing costs to minimal levels. 
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SECTION EIGHT 
8 OPERATIONS AND FINANCING OF THE JOINT VENTURE 
8.1 Integrating the Joint Venture 
The South African joint venture between Safmarine and the Black operators can be 
. incorporated in South Africa to exploit advantages of cargo and market know-how. 
The elevation of the South African ship registry will pressure the government to 
recognise the commercial advantages to the South African shipping industry. 
In determining the success of the jOint venture the parent companies of 
Safmarine/Blacks operators should employ trust as an important tool. Trusting each 
other is not only a major determinant but also a requisite in any form of joint venture, 
whether between national or international companies. 
For the joint venture to operate smoothly, an explicit framework of equal participation 
should be devised covering all areas of legal and financial matters of the new entity. 
For example equal participation to imply equal number of directors from Safmarine 
and Black operators. The jOint venture will also state in the agreement the terms of 
appointment of the chairman and chief executive officer of the new company, and the 
appointment a senior management team drawn from the executives of the two 
companies. 
These operational parameters should be within the confines of the defined objectives 
of the joint venture. In addition the legal framework should clearly define the 
partnership in the jOint venture. Some joint ventures provide separate agreements 
between each of the partners themselves and another set between each partner and 
the jOint venture (C. Grammenos, page 17-9). By use of this method any conflict that 
will arise between partners may be solved without directly affecting the joint venture 
(C. Grammenos, page 17-9). 
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8.1 .1 Safmarine Container Lines in the Joint Venture 
The origin of Safmarine dates back to more than 50 years ago, which was financed 
by the Industrial Development Corporation (I DC). Safmarine being floated on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) the majority of the shares were bought by Old 
Mutual , who then became the owner of Safmarine. Later Safmarine diversified and 
incorporated into Safren, a group of three major companies composed of: 
• Safmarine, operating shipping vessels in major areas of bulk, reefers and 
container carriers 
• Rennies, running forwarding, packaging, freight, terminal and logistics, 
and 
• Kersaf Investments, operating hotels, gaming, casinos, etc. 
Figure 8.1: Strategic Integration of the JV 
Container 
Lines 
Reefers 
Safmarine Container Lines! 
SA Black Operators JV 
Bulk 
Cargo 
Investments 
Safren group faced with a multifaceted business decided to focus on core businesses 
and adopted the strategy of "unbundling". Kersaf investments were cut out of the 
Safren Group in order to optimise the related business units of shipping and freight. 
As a result Safren intensified these units and then added to them similar operations 
in aircraft leasing and operation (Sun Air), foreign exchange and travel services. 
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Safmarine's intensification strategy coupled with increased competitive pressure from 
major carriers in the liner operation, Safmarine incorporated CMB NV, a Belgium liner 
company in 1997, and fully acquired CMB by mid 1998. The acquisition was 
renamed Safmarine Container Lines (SCL) without dropping the brand CMB for 
market share maintenance and growth. 
As a result· the Safmarine Container Lines/CMB became the largest operator in the 
European/African markets. Since the acquisition Safmarine own about 50 container 
vessels with sizes ranging from 1200-3100 TEUs capacity, and over 80,000 
containers of various types. Despite holding the market share, Safmarine 
experienced a declined market demand since 1997. This is caused by a slump in the 
world economy, the Asian financial crisis, increased new-building deliveries and 
competition from the carriers from the wesUeast markets breaking into less 
competitive north/south markets. As a result Safmarine's liner division in 1998 had a 
decline in operating profit of 8% from 1997. 
8.1.1.1 Demutualisation Programme 
Following the demutualisation program of Old Mutual (the owner of Safmarine on the 
basis of majority shares) Safmarine was advertised for sale by end of 1998. 
Safmarine is admired and attractive to some conglomerate shipping companies. If 
the sale goes to a foreign carrier, South Africa will lose a valuable shipping company 
and the edge in trade and economic cost advantages. This will be a blow in the face 
of the South African maritime industry. 
An alternative way of moving ahead without affecting the demutualisation programme 
of Old Mutual is to unbundle Safmarine into three sectors of bulk, reefers and 
container carriers and sell them individually. This process could carry a clause that 
will allow Safmarine management to forfeit their dividends for a possible 
management buy-out (MBO). 
However MBOs are rare particularly in less developed economies such as South . 
Africa. But it is a common process in developed economies for management to take 
over ownership of company in a similar situation like Safmarine. The advantages 
being that the market will not lose confidence in the company; there will be no 
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changes in objectives and strategies of the company hence perpetuity in serving 
South Africa's comparative advantages in maritime industry. As a result MBO will 
provide expertise suitable for merging the two companies into a South African joint 
venture. 
8.1.1.2 The Black Operators in the Joint Venture 
The study presents the Black operators company as a theoretical and imaginary 
company. The operators are assumed to have acquired a strong shipping 
background. The company operates leased and chartered vessels of all sectors of 
deep-sea shipping and therefore owns neither vessels nor equipment. But they have 
created a medium size operation and command a share in the North/South markets. 
Equal participation with Safmarine Container Lines (SCL) in a joint venture will be 
based on valuation of assets and liabilities of the two companies and that will be 
merged into a joint venture entity. 
8.2 The Joint Venture Market Share 
The joint venture will adopt a new name, which enable the company to maintain the 
market share of the parent companies. They might have to weigh the option of using 
the brand, Safmarine against that of the Black operators or the blending of the two 
names to capture their original market share. This will also include the adoption or 
market mix of the two companies' strategy. 
The joint venture will be poised to develop into a more powerful presence in the 
North/South markets. It will be the largest container liner operator in the 
Europe/African markets. The advantage of local market knowledge will give the 
Safmarine/Black operators an edge over their major competitors. The jOint venture 
should also be consistent with. the South African multi-modal strategy to leverage 
liner activities in order to promote growth and development of the land activities. 
8.3 The Joint Venture Capital Participation 
The joint venture will have to start with a fair initial capital from the combination of the 
two companies' capital participation. Joint investment raises the creditworthiness of 
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the company for ease access to capital finance at the same time spreading the risk of 
investment. By combining the two companies' synergies the joint venture is poised to 
break-even early as a result of increased sales revenue from the combination of the 
companies' throughput TEUs and generate major economies of scale for the joint 
venture. This will certainly provide value for a further growth, strength and the much-
needed profitability. 
8.3.1 Financing of the Joint Venture 
However, in terms of acquisitions and expansion debt financing could be a better 
option depending on the considerations: 
• Level of collateral security (mortgage security, insurance, promissory and 
credit letters, and guarantees) and Safmarine's good management can 
also provide guarantee and safe investment, 
• Condition of the joint venture (which looks very favourable in terms of 
I 
company liquidity and solvency). The financial state of Safmarine (positive 
cash flows annually and high margins of operating profits) provide 
attractive company conditions to the joint venture. Obviously the creditors 
also examine the overall economic and political conditions as given in 
section three, shipping markets including the joint venture objectives and 
strategies, 
• capital (equity participation of the joint venture) as pointed out above, 
• capacity (management ability to manage and handle investment, 
reduction of costs,- charteriogr_risk hedging. shipping contracts and the 
ability to collect debts and payment of credits), and 
• Character of the joint venture, which dates back to the parent companies' 
reputation, integrity in terms of dealing with business associates and rival 
competitors, loan record and creditworthiness. 
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The 5Cs (capital, conditions, collateral, capacity and character) provide the basis of 
credit analysis of all shipping loan projects. The Safmarine/Black operators joint 
venture will be expected to satisfy all the requirements for their acquisitions and 
expansion programs. The previous operations of Safmarine and the Black operators 
that went with a lot of success despite operational problems of low volumes of the 
North/South markets and the overall cyclical nature of shipping and the world 
economy. The two companies' previous success would certainly meet the demands 
of the 5Cs to warrant the joint venture debt financing. 
However during the current times ship finance have diversified, creating wide choices 
for the owners on which financial products and how to finance acquisition, 
, replacements and expansion and sources of finance. Owners can now tap capital 
finance from various sources that include financial institutions, insurance houses, 
capital markets on top of the traditional shipping banks. 
8.3.1.1 Debt/Equity Finance 
Debt financing of all financial products has been the traditional shipping capital. 
Shipping banks normally provide the mezzanine capital structure, which requires 
relative capital inputs from both the banks and owners. The advantages for debt 
financing are as follows: 
• The joint venture management team will be pushed to work hard in order 
to pay back the principal amount with interest depending on the agreed 
method of repayment, 
• Debt increases the amount of leverage; therefore management will react 
profitably by use of debt financing projects. 
Unlike equity, which will be money already in the joint venture, management may not 
be diSCiplined in the use of equity. The tendency of contentment would quickly grip 
and allocate more money to salaries and dividends, which reduce the value of the 
joint venture. With debt, management will be aware of the consequences of debt, so 
use it profitably. 
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Equity also increases the costs of financial distress by way of losing tax shields. 
Therefore the joint venture could opt to increase the creditors capital input ratio at the 
same time decreasing the difference between the creditors and the joint venture 
capital inputs. The advantage being that the joint venture capital participation will 
then largely cover areas of essential costs, for example insurance and the balance 
sheet for strong cash flow. To conclude the equity issue could be the last resort when 
the joint venture had exhausted debt capacity in order to gain optimum operation. 
While debt financing is still superior and typically traditional in ship financing, owners 
equity in recent times demand for capital structures, which are sophisticated and less 
cost. Faced with a wide array of sources, owners are now able to shop and mix 
financial products and also negotiate sophisticated capital contracts. The reason 
being that debt financing has been risky, with interest rates far above the base rate 
by wide margins. Sometimes lenders have even treated debt as venture capital, 
asking for involvement in the operations, which could include a share of the profit. 
8.3.1.2 Capital Markets Finance 
The most common of many of the new forms of ship financing is througt) capital 
markets. These markets are found in many centres of world and issue equity and 
debt stocks in a number of ways. Equity stocks are in the form of public issue 
including the initial public offerings (lPOs) and private placements. Debt issues are in 
the form of bonds. In either way shipping companies sell these issues on these 
markets in terms of shares and debts (shareholders and bondholders) to raise capital 
for expansion and replacements. 
The decision to sell equity or bond should go with the objectives of the jOint venture 
in terms of what the comparw 'pri_orj!is~_s~? ~_~~ __ ~~e 1l)<?f1ey>_ ~h~ term th~ jOint venture 
needs the money, what form of currency, including the costs and tax associated with 
the issue. In addition to that the joint venture should consider and compare location 
and size of the market. For example, the Oslo Stock Exchange (OS E) focuses 
primarily on the local companies; London Stock Exchange (LSE) has huge expertise 
in the sector of shipping and easily accessed by international investors. New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) is more costly in terms of registration and annual fees; 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) expertise in the shipping sector is limited and 
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the constraints of the Rand/USD exchange rate; Singapore may be an interesting 
place for shipping issues. 
One area where stock issues can restrain relations between the management of joint 
venture and the underwriters is valuation of market price of the company assets. For 
instance, management will offer higher prices with underwriters offering low prices. It 
is important for management in timing the decision of issuing the stocks because 
pricing or valuation of assets will normally couple with the state of the market. 
Reput.ation and knowledge (expertise) should form the basis of choosing 
underwriters by the joint venture. The joint venture should match the company 
objectives with the skills of the underwriters. Inexperienced underwriters may 
understate the value of the joint- venture assets because it's a South African 
company. Underwriters should have the ability to assist the joint venture with drafting 
terms of issue in terms of size; interest rates and issue prices at the same time 
meeting the requirements of the market. 
However the main constraint posed by the capital markets after the issue, is the 
dilution of the joint venture control. Floating stocks on the market is like the company 
going public and therefore the joint venture will be required to disclose company 
accounts, publish quarterly and annual reports to inform share/bond holders of the 
state of the company for public accountability. This factor has limited many family 
owned shipping businesses from regarding the capital markets as ways of raising 
capital and thus stick to the traditional ways of shipping finance. 
Regarding the above organisation of the capital structure of the joint venture, the 
method of partnership and financial commitments of the partners, it is imPortant for 
the company to draw up documents binding the participants to the jOint venture. The 
documents should also include vital legal aspects, methods of keeping accounts, 
exchange of information, and restriction of competition between partners comprising 
the jOint venture, grounds of dissolution of the joint venture and provision for the 
distribution of the joint venture assets upon such dissolution, distribution of profits 
and many other areas of importance. This will make the joint venture operational with 
limited restrictions. 
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SECTION NINE 
9. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE SAFMARINEIBLACKS JV 
9.1 Advantages of the Joint Venture 
The Safmarine/Blacks joint venture has potential advantages in stabilising the 
company through (a) improvement of revenues; (b) achieve major cost reduction and 
control; (c) increased managerial and operational efficiency; (d) spreading the risk of 
establish an enterprise; (e) raise fresh capital; (f) acquire market power; and (g) 
achieve economies of scale. 
The notion of comparative advantage provided by the Euro-centric scholars does not 
lie in harmony with the Safmarine/Blacks joint venture. They viewed all joint ventures 
in less developed ·economies as either between companies from the developed 
economies or companies from developing and developed economies. In the case of 
a joint venture between companies from developed and less developed economies, 
the one from the developed country will have comparative advantage in managerial, 
financial and technical expertise added by the availability of capital and access to 
financing sources and existence of developed infrastructure. The company from the 
less developed country will have comparative advantage in labour and resources 
such as cargo (C. Grammenos). 
On the contrary, Safmarine is a South African company, which is the largest 
container operator in the Europe/African markets. Safmarine has a· record of strong 
cash flows and high operating profits (Appendix) have established world class 
infrastructure and been able to- finance ·alr its acquisitions. The Black operators are a 
medium size company, well managed and has created wealth that has induced 
Safmarine to submerge their synergies into a joint venture to achieve greater 
performance and efficiency, competition and cost savings. The joint venture will be 
economically superior to what they can provide individually. Therefore the 
fundamental objective of the joint venture is the need to maintain South African 
comparative cost advantage in containerisation over their foreign competitors. 
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The Safmarine/Blacks joint venture will reduce major overhead costs as a result of 
the economies of scale to acquire market power and coverage. Reduction in cost will 
result in increased revenue and stability of the company and also provide much need 
employment in South Africa. 
Safmarine and the Blacks operators will certainly need each other and that sort of co-
operation will be reinforced by increased competitive pressure from foreign carriers. 
The Black operators will benefit the economies of scale provided by Safmarine and 
break into Safmarine's wide and established markets in Europe, Asia, America and 
Africa. Therefore Safmarine is regarded as the safe route to sustainable survival in 
the North/South markets. In addition the Blacks by participation in the joint venture 
. will benefit lower operational costs and not see elimination like many other 
small/medium operators. The Blacks will also improve their access to major capital 
financing. 
Safmarine will adopt lower cost shipping as a strategy and benefit increased volumes 
through the jOint venture partnership to contain the competitive pressures brought by? 
'. 
the expert foreign carriers. Safmarine will also benefit from the discovery of the 
previous untapped sources of equity capital and reduce its capital input requirements' :: 
as a result of sharing. 
• \f ~~, 
Since the objectives of Sel are in line with profitable services, can charge some 
additional fees for the services performed over and above the scope of the joint 
venture. These charges will emanate from the technical support, brokerage and 
agent networks, etc already established by Safmarine. Therefore the joint venture will 
help Safmarine to maximise the utility of the existing administrative and technical 
network. 
This means that from the joint venture the Blacks will largely benefit from the 
sophisticated infrastructure laid down by Safmarine in terms of shipping 
infrastructures such as shippers, insurance, brokerage, port terminals and cargo 
handling facilities, transhipments to further inland countries through transport 
systems, local repairs and maintenance (C. Grammenos). In addition to that the 
Blacks through the joint venture will develop managerial, technical and operational 
skills by the assistance of Safmarine Container Lines (SCl). 
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In terms of labour availability the South African environment provides cheaper labour 
than in many of the developed economies. Although labour unions in South Africa 
look militant agitated by the liberal democratic policies the potential for investment 
and growth is still there. For example, cheaper and skilled labour has provided 
Safmarine to operate at capacity. Such labour force will be sufficient for the joint 
venture to perform equally well, for example, in the manning of sophisticated vessels. 
9.2 Disadvantages of the Joint Venture 
The Safmarine/Blacks jOint venture may exhibit a considerable degree of 
protectionism, which could not be in line with the policy of free markeU trade 
portrayed by South Africa. The creation of a consolidatea organisation will pose not 
much difference from the structures of closed conferences and consortia that are 
. oligapolistic in nature and frequently clash with independent operators. As a result 
the joint venture might be difficult to justify the comparative advantage theory, which 
campaign for free trade. 
The joint venture might even become a useful tool to convince the government of the 
economic and commercial benefits of the South African maritime industry, and 
require government support. The nature of such support will be tantamount to 
subsidies, which are a fundamental mechanism of protectionism. Accordingly the 
South African shipping industry basically needs some form of government subsidies 
to exploit the economic potential of the industry. Therefore the joint venture could 
also be a potential tool to erode the industrial market forces already in place and as 
result free container tramping could be threatened. Despite that the theory of infant 
support is debatable. 
The fundamental objective of the jOint venture is to co-operate into a consolidation. 
Then the synergies of the two companies result in comparative cost advantage of the 
. South African cont'ainer sector over foreign carriers. The joint venture involves the 
carriage and movement of cargo, which may find difficulties to draw up a dividing line 
between co-operation and protectionism. Naturally protectionism reduces competition 
and also affects the quality of service and efficiency improvements. 
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Many of the international joint ventures suffer from the lack of communication, 
especially joint ventures between different nations and languages. These' joint 
ventures incur extra costs to facilitate intermediary assistance or interpretation. In 
such cases research will be affected, as the joint venture may not be able to carry out 
joint research programmes. Advice to the joint venture will be in whole, inadequate. 
In addition assistance to the jOint venture at the early stages is of crucial importance 
and if communication is problematic then the joint venture will not be operational. 
However Safmarine/Blacks joint' venture may be affected by communication 
problems to a less extent. The advantage being that the joint venture will be 
formation of South African companies, with similar official language background, 
familiar cultural background and a familiar business environment. The joint venture 
_T__ _ 
might only need intermediary (brokering) assistance when dealing with crec;:litors or-
clients of different nations or languages. 
Another important factor that the Safmarine/Blacks joint venture will suffer in the 
distrust between the two companies arising from "political and economical ideologies; 
from misconception and misunderstanding; from prejudiced philosophies ... " (C. 
Grammenos, page 17-9). Had the joint venture been, for instance, between the 
South African Blacks and a company from either Europe or America, where 
operations will suffer from the distance between the two companies; from the Blacks; 
claims of the European company exploitation; from the European company; claims 
that the less developed SA Blacks are unreliable (C. Grammenos page 17-9). These 
potential obstacles could lead to a significant misunderstanding between the two 
/ 
companies (Safmarine/Blacks) and mar the operations of the joint venture or to 
eventual break-up. 
The managerial gap between Safmarine and the Blacks might hinder the 
development of the joint venture. For instance, Safmarine is used to intensive 
competitive pressures and therefore the way they handle and see things in the joint 
venture could be different. This could result in internal competition and rivalry 
between the two companies, hence making processes for decision more complex. 
This problem could be excarcebated when Safmarine and the Blacks were rival 
competitors prior to the joint venture. That could create a general reluctance to co-
operate in the business of the joint venture. 
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To conclude, in many cases disadvantages have often outweighed advantages. As 
such many jOint ventures in the field of shipping have had mixed experiences and 
many of the previous studies in joint ventures have shown little successes. However 
the experience will leave each of the parties with something to hang onto, therefore 
the measure of joint ventures should not be largely based on the success or length of 
co-operation. Emphasis could also be placed on attainability of the objectives of the 
joint venture. In this case, if Safmarine and the blacks break up after delivering the 
objectives of their co-operation, leaving each other with a value in terms of wealth, 
equipment, managerial and technical skills then the joint venture would achieved the 
goals of their co-operation. 
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SECTION TEN 
10 CONCLUSION 
10.1 Trade and Investment Outlook 
South Africa has been regarded as the gateway to African investment and economic 
growth and this is so because of the country's economic infrastructure that is 
attractive for foreign capital investment. In addition to this, among many emerging 
economies that include Russia, India and Brazil, South Africa has largely resisted the 
economic and financial shocks that emanated from the Far East and South East 
Asia. 
By and large some of the economic fundamentals of South Africa are still intact. For 
example by end of 1998 the merchandise exports surged by 25%. This was largely 
helped by the trade marginal exchange rate of the Rand during the latter part of 
1998. As a result South Africa's intematiom31 competitiveness could lead to an 
export-led economic recovery before the end of 2000. However the advantage of 
currency depreciation could be a· short-term opportunity hence South Africa should 
use it intelligently by putting the country clearly on the track to economic growth. 
Table 10.1: South African Balance of Payments (R & $ million) 
1997 %4 1998 %0 1999 %0 
Merchandise Exports (R) 114142 12.5 132809 16.5 155212 16.9 
Merchandise Imports (R) 130844 11.1 149119 14.0 172033 15.4 
Trade Account (R) 9116 9947 11377 
($) 1979 .-- -- - .1809 __ . 1827 
Net Service Payment (R) -17929 -19757 -19927 
Net Transfers ($) -3891 -3593 -3199 
Current Account (R) -8813 -9810 -8550 
($) -1913 -1784 -1373 
Current Account (R) 20246 -834 16100 
($) 4394 -152 2585 
Source: Economic Momtor Index (South Afnca) 
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Another fundamental is the merchandise imports, which are relatively decreasing as ' 
a result of increased import prices. However the situation could be rescued by the 
continued lifting of tariff protection and create competitive consumer prices. Inflation, 
which is at its lowest level (see earlier discussion) has a double score, one in slower· 
rate of production price index (2% in 1998) and the second one is the general prices 
of goods that also include imported goods and commodities, which declined by 1.6% 
since 1997. This has partly resulted from the low inflation rates of South Africa's 
trading partners as can be seen in Tables 3.2 and 3.4. Despite the constraints of the 
depreciation of the Rand, low inflation will necessitate for high consumption and 
growth of imports. 
10.2 Investment Outlook 
The shift of policy from economic growth and redistribution (GEAR) to social reform 
will undermine domestic and international business confidence. The shift is not timely 
enough to sustain business and may not be compatible with the economic 
adjustment policy of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) This 
wilLdecelerate economic growth, trigger public financial shortages and eventually dry 
up savings. 
The fixed investment by public institutions (Figure 3.3) will only increase marginally 
as money will be going to finance current expenditures. Gross domestic savings will 
therefore deplete to lowest level of the GOP. However the government could 
emphasise on financing investment in order to achieve a higher sustainable 
economic growth. 
Table 10.2: Income and Expenditure of General Government 
1996 1998 1999F 
.-.---~ - ----
Direct Tax (% of GOP) 15.6 16.8 16.1 
Indirect Tax (% of GOP) 12.1 12.1 12.1 
Deficit Before Borrow 1% of GDPl 5.5 5.6 5.0 
Saving (% of GOP) -3.7 -3.7 -3.1 
Consumption Expenditure (% /1) 7.1 3.3 -1.9 
Fixed Investment (% D) 4.0 2.1 2.6 
Source: Economic Momtor Index (South Afnca) 
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Private and foreign capital investment flows will be much attracted by the 
privatisation of parastatals or public assets. This is one area where South Africa will 
continue to receive continued inflow of foreign capital in particular. Many other 
sectors of the economy such as agriculture and mining have had problems of output 
probably caused by adverse weather conditions for agriculture and increased cost of 
production and lower commodity prices in the case of the mining industry. 
However the manufacturing output has been growing during the past three years 
(see appendix). The growth and marketing of such products can be affected if South 
Africa loses its comparative cost advantage of moving products to overseas markets 
as result of losing its lucrative container industry to foreigners. These products will 
suffer competitive prices from the high quality and lower priced products of the 
developed economies. 
10.3 South African Social and Economic Outlook 
Despite the above major economic fundamentals three prominent factors, (a) high 
level of crimes; (b) lack of economic growth and; (c) high level unemployment have 
bedevilled South Africa. The declining gross domestic product (Table 3.6 (b» is a 
symptom of lack of economic activities (investment, savings, etc) that could be a 
result of inadequate economic and fiscal policies. As such business will need to be 
influenced to generate profits that will in turn stimulate investment and job creation 
and hence perpetual wealth. 
High level crimes will work against business and investment. Certain businesses will 
close down operations and investment diverted to other potential regions. South 
Africa will need to adopt sound socio-economic policies that will enhance the 
country's stance on perform~rJpe_ an9_prosper~yjn ___ order to retain business 
confidence. 
However South Africa hangs on a vibrant liberal democracy that has instilled an 
atmosphere of political stability unlike in most of the parts of Africa, East Europe, 
Asia and Latin America. Political stability is compatible with investment. In addition to 
this, the country's liberal constitution makes the legal aspect of business operational 
and this resembles the western business environments. 
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10.4 The Shipping Policy of South Africa and Prospects 
The proposal of a container joint venture between Safmarine and Blacks could be 
regarded as a strategy that will add value to the South African shipping industry in 
terms of economic advantages and contribute towards fiscal gains. Beside the 
advantages mounting to the container company through economies of scale, a 
competitive South African carrier will help save foreign currency payments, stop the 
deteriorating net service payments account (Table 10.1) and in turn will improve the 
trade account as exports are bound to continue growing. 
This will call the government to consider shipping as one of its strategic policies, 
continue with its policies of market forces at the same time creating opportunities that 
strengthen the maritime industry in South Africa .. For instance, the OECD countries 
have introduced a policy of re-regulatory of market forces. This entails adoption 
liberal policies that bring advantages to the local industries and also accommodates 
foreign investment and trade. 
Therefore shipping in South Africa will help create employment and investment 
opportunities, and this will be at a limited scale if the government continues with the 
wait and see policy Without exercising its support, unlike most governments in the 
developed economies. 
10.5 World Economic Outlook 
Investment will need to be returned to the emerging economies in order to balance 
out trade between developed and less developed nations. A totally different approach 
regarding financial markets, and economic development should be adopted, 
especially by the International Monetary Fum:J (UVlf) and the World Bank. Devaluation 
of currencies, a brainchild of the IMF will hit hard the potential economies and reduce 
domestic consumption to very lower levels. Merchandise trade will suffer from local 
substitutions because of excessive exchange rates. 
There is a great need to introduce new forms of economic development programmes 
that will not result in starving the majority of the nations and enrich few economies. 
Most of the economies, which have suffered because of the IMF-Iead programs, fall 
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in the Southern Hemisphere, where the majority of potential economies are found. 
The repercussions will surface with depressed economic activities that will affect all 
service industries with huge negative effects on shipping, especially in the less 
developed North/South markets. 
In Asia, a quick recovery of Japan will be crucial to the whole region. Japanese 
investment in the region (in less production cost economies) had lead to export 
growth and increased shipping volumes and activities in the Trans/pacific rim. With 
the advent of the Asian financial crisis, which compressed output and depressed 
demand thereby resulted in adverse container trade imbalances. Therefore the 
recovery of Japan will not only give life to the Asian region but to many economic 
sectors of the world. 
10.6 Prospects for the Joint Venture 
The purchase of Safmarine (SCl) by Maersk Lines draws many conclusions with 
short and long term effects. In the short-term, competition on the Southern 
African/European trade will ease. Maersk will consider redeployment of some of their 
vessels to other trade routes. The push behind the move will be partly caused by the 
anticipated recovery of the Asian economies. 
Secondly Maersk will not risk dropping the brand name· of Safmarine Container 
Lines. This will assist Maersk to retain Safmarine's market share and probably 
command the largest market share in the North/South trade. As a result freight rates 
will shortly move up to cover costs. 
In the long-term, SCl will be merged with Maersk as a cost saving strategy. Maersk 
would also want to create ~ __ ~ing_le __ yis!9n,_ a c~:>nsolidated marketing and 
administrative strategy. This will result in loss of employment and incomes as the two 
become "one". 
Rates restoration will be short-lived. The success of Maersk will attract major carriers 
into the European/Southern African trade. This will be triggered by economic 
recovery of some African economies. Any deployment of excess vessels that failing 
to match the WesUEa&t trade (Transatlantic and Transpacific), will decrease freight 
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rates. This will adversely affect small and medium operators such as the "Black 
aspirants". Lack of adequate financial back up will quicken their eventual shut 
demise. 
However the loss of SCL could jeopardise the "Black operators". The proposed South 
African joint venture will be lost without South African lines coming together into a 
consolidation. Maersk is a foreign carrier and a family business venture. Their 
successful purchase of SCL has edged them into the North/South trade by capturing 
a lucrative market, particularly in South Africa. Therefore a joint venture will not be an 
issue to Maersk. Consolidation with the Black operators might be at a conference 
level, which is far away from a joint venture. 
The joint venture h~ad multifacet benefits accruing not only to the Black operators, but 
also to the public of South Africa. For the Black operators it would have encouraged 
them to grow and enjoy economies of scale, expand through ease access to financial 
requirement at interbank market. However all these benefits are now blocked and 
salvation may only come from the government. One way that could be used to breath 
life to small and medium operators is to fine-tune the mandate that regulates the 
Industrial Development Co-operation (IDC) to extend its current funding of 
manufacturing related industries to service industries. For example Safmarine's 
possible birth was engineered by the IDC over fifty years ago before the IDC was 
re-regislated to fund manufacturing projects only. 
Without this support operators such as the Black operators and many other small and 
medium size carriers may not expand, fail to access financial requirements at 
international and local markets and may be forced to leave shipping. The joint 
venture with SCL could have benefitted the Black operators with many benefits 
including finance for investment,-providing-a- relative number of choices and mix to 
meet investment requirements. Nevertheless the joint venture could have been one 
of the strategies employed to pursue for government support for the South African 
shipping industry. 
The purchase of SCL will deny the economy from achieving positive trade balances 
and affect the public current accounts. Foreign currency will continue falling and 
increase the rate of outflows. Dividends and profits, which SCL used to retain in 
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South Africa, will then be paid overseas. At a larger scale trade will be in FOB terms 
with payments settled overseas. A large proportion of the shipping· business will 
continue in foreign hands. This result will negatively affect the balance of payments. 
Therefore the purchase of SCl is not only a loss of prospective growth, opportunities 
and objectives of a South African container joint venture, but it can be regarded as 
public loss as well. The sense of national pride in shipping has been shaken. 
Safmarine's successful story is a treasure in the history of the maritime industry of 
South Africa. 
South African trade may not be the same again. The objective of SCl served and 
promoted the basic principles of South African trade with other countries. The loss of 
SClcould undermine the export competitive advantage of some South African 
commodities and goods at international markets, especially now when the economy 
is export geared. 
Although the loss of SCl to a foreign carrier has strangled the jOint venture 
possibilities, the objectives of this should remain the same. The end of SCl should 
not be the end of road. Other options such as a jOint investment between small and 
medium size carriers could be adopted. This can be done in conjunction with a 
vigorous pursuance of government support. The overall objective will be to achieve 
low cost carrier operation, growth, increased market share and accessing financial 
investment and requirements. 
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